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I. INTRODUCTION
1

John has Asperger’s Syndrome. None of his coworkers were aware of it,
even though a few may have suspected it; what others around him saw was a
model employee, a highly competent, highly motivated worker who kept calm
2
under the most trying of circumstances. He sometimes seemed withdrawn and
often found excuses to avoid office parties, but, by and large, his coworkers
3
assumed that he was simply a workaholic.
But in December 2012, everything changed for John. On December 14, a
lone gunman named Adam Lanza killed twenty-six people at an elementary
4
school in Connecticut before turning his gun on himself. Within hours, as more
information on Lanza was uncovered, several press reports focused on
5
speculation that he might have Asperger’s Syndrome. A guest on CNN’s Piers

1. Asperger’s Syndrome is an autistic spectrum disorder characterized by “severe and sustained
impairment in social interaction . . . and the development of restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests,
and activities . . . .” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
80 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. It differs from the diagnosis of autism primarily in that it
does not feature a delay in early childhood development of language and cognitive skills. Id. Because the
distinction between Asperger’s Syndrome and autism is unclear and has no practical value to clinicians, the
DSM-V will merge Asperger’s Syndrome and autism into a single diagnosis called “autism spectrum disorder.”
Jon Hamilton, Asperger’s Officially Placed Inside Autism Spectrum, NPR (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=123527833 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. Although John is fictitious, this is a fairly common profile of people with psychiatric disabilities: many
go to great lengths to keep peers from becoming aware of their diagnoses. See Susan G. Goldberg et al., The
Disclosure Conundrum: How People with Psychiatric Disabilities Navigate Employment, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 463, 479 (2005) (describing challenges to which people with psychiatric disabilities are willing to
face to avoid disclosing their disabilities). People with Asperger’s Syndrome are often able to mask the effects
of the disorder: “for example, the individual may learn to apply explicit verbal rules or routines in certain
stressful situations. . . . [A]s adults, many individuals are capable of gainful employment and personal selfsufficiency.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 1, at 82.
3. This, too, is fairly common for people with psychiatric disabilities: one recent study of highfunctioning people with schizophrenia found that working is a common coping mechanism. Elyn Saks,
Successful and Schizophrenic, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/opinion/
sunday/schizophrenic-not-stupid.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). One respondent in a study
“works on the weekends too because of ‘the distraction factor.’ In other words, by engaging in work, the crazy
stuff often recedes to the sidelines.” Id.
4. Tracy Connor & Pete Williams, Newtown Gunman Forced His Way into School, Police Say, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 15, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/15/15926718-newtown-gunman-forced-hisway-into-school-police-say (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
5. E.g., David M. Halbfinger, A Gunman, Recalled as Intelligent and Shy, Who Left Few Footprints in
Life, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/nyregion/adam-lanza-an-enigma-whois-now-identified-as-a-mass-killer.html (reporting that several of Lanza’s high-school classmates “had been
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Morgan Tonight suggested that people with autism spectrum disorders might be
7
more prone to violence because they lacked a “capacity for empathy.” Even
family members of people with autism spectrum disorders expressed fear that
8
their children might become mass murderers. Although mental health
professionals and advocates for people with autism spectrum disorders quickly
9
pushed back against negative media portrayals of Asperger’s Syndrome, the
damage had been done where John was concerned. Later that week, one of
John’s coworkers, who had viewed Piers Morgan Tonight after the Connecticut
mass shooting, began to suspect that John might have an autism spectrum
disorder and told a supervisor that John might fit Adam Lanza’s profile. John was
fired the next day and was told that he was being removed from the workplace
because he was a danger to himself and everyone around him.
John was well-informed enough to file a charge of disability discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC). The EEOC
investigated his charge and found that there were indeed facts suggesting that he
had been fired, at least in part, because of his mental illness. His employer
refused to negotiate a settlement, however, and lacking the resources to file a
lawsuit, the EEOC instead issued John a right-to-sue notice.
John retained an attorney shortly thereafter. The attorney advised him that,
although he had a strong case for disability discrimination under the Americans
10
with Disabilities Act (ADA), his remedies would likely be limited to
11
reinstatement and back pay. Although it is true that intentional discrimination
told” that he had Asperger’s Syndrome and that law enforcement officials “were closely examining whether Mr.
Lanza had such a disorder”) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
6. See supra note 1 (defining autism spectrum disorder).
7. Tommy Christopher, Piers Morgan Quack Says People With Autism Lack Empathy: ‘Something’s
Missing In The Brain’, MEDIAITE (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.mediaite.com/tv/piers-morgan-quack-sayspeople-with-autism-lack-empathy-somethings-missing-in-the-brain/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
This was not the first time in 2012 that autism spectrum disorders had been associated with violence by
television commentators. MSNBC’s Joe Scarborough had previously responded to a mass shooting in Aurora,
Colorado by suggesting that mass shooters tended to be “somewhere, I believe, on the autism scale.” Dylan
Byers, Scarborough: Holmes ‘On Autism Scale’, POLITICO (July 23, 2012), http://www.politico.com/blogs/
media/2012/07/scarborough-holmes-on-autism-scale-129779.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
8. E.g., Liza Long, Thinking the Unthinkable, THE ANARCHIST SOCCER MOM (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://anarchistsoccermom.blogspot.com/2012/12/thinking-unthinkable.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
Pamela Mirghani, My Brother Is Not Adam Lanza, But He Could Be, W. AUSTL. TODAY (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://www.watoday.com.au/opinion/my-brother-is-not-adam-lanza-but-he-could-be-20121221-2bql1.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
9. E.g., Adam Martin, Asperger’s Is a Red Herring to Explain the Newtown Massacre, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 16,
2012), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/12/aspergers-is-a-red-herring-to-explain-newtown.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
10. See infra Part II.B (discussing an employer’s affirmative duties in evaluating a direct threat to the
health or safety of the workplace). John’s employer, by failing to evaluate whether his disability actually created
significant danger in the workplace, clearly breached that duty. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006) (listing equitable remedies for employment discrimination); see infra
Part III (discussing remedies actually received by prevailing disability discrimination plaintiffs with psychiatric
disabilities).
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on the basis of disability carries compensatory and possibly punitive damages,
13
proving intent would be difficult. John’s supervisor did not actually know that
John had Asperger’s Syndrome, but had simply acted hastily, and arguably
negligently, on a report that John’s behavior might have had parallels to Adam
14
Lanza’s behavior prior to December 14.
At this point, John faced a serious dilemma. His employer refused to
negotiate a settlement, and litigation seemed like a poor option even if he was
almost certain to prevail. John knew that, should he file suit, his diagnosis would
become public knowledge. Where his supervisor and a few coworkers may have
been aware of his Asperger’s Syndrome at the time he was fired, his entire
workplace would be aware if he were to be reinstated. Unable to accept that
possibility, John declined to file a civil complaint. Much like his namesake, the
protagonist of Joseph Heller’s Catch-22, John found himself in a situation where
15
the act of seeking a remedy would defeat the remedy itself.
People with psychiatric disabilities have reported experiencing worse
16
discrimination in the workplace than in any other context. Although John’s
story is fictitious, several commentators have discussed the scenario in which an
employee with a psychiatric condition is fired on the grounds of allegedly
17
endangering others in the workplace. Studies have repeatedly found that large
portions of the public greatly fear individuals with psychiatric conditions and
believe that people with psychiatric conditions are likely to commit violent acts,
18
regardless of the specific diagnosis. Even as American society has generally
become more accepting of differences, the stereotype of the dangerous
19
psychiatric patient appears to have actually increased over recent decades.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
13. See infra Part III.B (discussing reasons why plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities have difficulty
proving discriminatory intent).
14. Particularly when a plaintiff’s disability is psychiatric, courts are often reluctant to determine that
discrimination is intentional for a variety of reasons. See infra Part III.B.
15. John Yossarian, the novel’s protagonist, tries to escape World War II by asking his bomber
squadron’s doctor about the possibility of being grounded for insanity, only to discover that asking to be
grounded would prevent him from being grounded:
Orr [another pilot] was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he
did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly
more missions and sane if he didn’t, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was
crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very
deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.
JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 46 (Simon & Schuster, 1st paperback ed., 2004) (1961).
16. SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES 4 (2001).
17. E.g., Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 609–12
(2003) (discussing the fear that a mentally ill person may become violent as a driving force behind workplace
discrimination); Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of the ‘Dangerous Mentally Ill’, 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 849 (2001).
18. Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd Jones, Bridging the Physical-Mental Gap: An Empirical Look at
the Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN. L. REV. 47, 52 (2005).
19. Id.

992

_06_HSIEH_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:42 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol.44
Because proclivity for violence is the dominant stereotype, fear of violence is
probably the most common cause of employment discrimination against people
20
with psychiatric disabilities.
Courts have recognized that federal disability discrimination statutes are
21
intended to dispel myths about people with disabilities. However, despite that
stated goal, people with psychiatric disabilities continue to face a very real
22
“justice disparity” as compared to people with other disabilities. One study
found those with psychiatric disabilities experience less favorable litigation
outcomes, lower levels of satisfaction with the process of enforcement, and
reduced access to settlement negotiations and alternative dispute resolution, none
23
of which were entirely attributable to the relative merit of the cases brought.
Most of the scholarship on the difficulties faced by plaintiffs with psychiatric
24
disabilities has focused on the definition of disability. This focus was
historically well justified: psychiatric disability discrimination actions most
commonly failed at summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to prove
25
membership in the protected class under the ADA. The case law greatly
narrowed the definition of disability for both physical and mental disabilities

20. See Jean Campbell & Caroline L. Kaufmann, Equality and Difference in the ADA: Unintended
Consequences for Employment of People with Mental Health Disabilities, in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK
DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 221, 228 (Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan eds., 1997) (discussing employer
attitudes toward psychiatric disabilities). Surveys of employers support the same conclusion. One study found
that employers were more reluctant to hire applicants with a history of psychiatric illness than any of a list of
other factors, including ethnic minority status, physical disability, and even having a criminal record. Id. at 228–
29 (citing James N. Colbert et al., Two Psychological Portals of Entry for Disadvantaged Groups, 34
REHABILITATION LITERATURE 194 (1973)). Another found that the fear of violence was the highest-rated
concern of employers in hiring people with psychiatric illnesses. Id. at 228; see also Edward Diksa & E. Sally
Rogers, Employer Concerns about Hiring Persons with Psychiatric Disability: Results of the Employer Attitude
Questionnaire, 40 REHABILITATION COUNSELING BULL. 31 (1996) (finding a similar result six years later).
21. E.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–85 (1987) (describing the “basic
purpose” of the Rehabilitation Act as “to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or other
benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others.”).
22. Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA Enforcement System Treat People with
Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L. REV. 94 (2006). Swanson and his co-authors used empirical data to
test the hypothesis that the legal system might in some way treat people with psychiatric disabilities differently
from those with other disabilities. See id. They observe that “a justice disparity for people with psychiatric
disabilities would not be unique,” citing the long, continuing struggle to combat “persistent perceptions of
racial, ethnic, and gender bias in the administration of justice.” Id. at 136.
23. Id. at 139.
24. See, e.g., Michelle Parikh, Note, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There Is Nothing Left for
Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to Persons with Mental Illness, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
721 (2004); Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining “Disability” Discrimination: A Proposal to
Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 321 (2003); Randal I. Goldstein,
Note, Mental Illness in the Workplace After Sutton v. United Air Lines, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (2001).
25. See Center & Imparato, supra note 24, at 327 (“[H]ostile court rulings frequently turn on whether the
individual is ‘substantially limited.’”); Goldstein, supra note 24, at 950 (citing cases in which courts rejected
psychiatric disability discrimination claims because “medications and counseling allow [the plaintiffs] to
function without limitation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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from Congress’s intended definition, requiring that a plaintiff have a condition
that “prevents or severely restricts” an activity “of central importance to most
27
28
people’s daily lives” and that the condition be considered in its mitigated state.
The restricted definition of disability had a disproportionate effect on
psychiatric disability plaintiffs because the ADA specifically protects “qualified”
29
individuals with disabilities. Because people with psychiatric illnesses are, by
definition, impaired in cognitive function, their disability directly impacts their
qualifications for many jobs. The United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the statute as requiring severe and pervasive limitation despite mitigation
30
excluded individuals who had well-controlled mental illness. Although
appropriate mental healthcare might make a plaintiff able to perform job duties,
any plaintiff who could prove that he or she was thus qualified for a job would
31
then have difficulty proving the existence of a protected disability.
In 2008, in response to the judicial narrowing of the definition of
“disability,” Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), greatly
32
expanding the scope of the term. In its findings, Congress expressly repudiated
33
court decisions that had narrowed the definition of “disability.”
With the passage of the ADAAA, many more ADA plaintiffs are now able to
pass the threshold test of establishing membership in the protected class. Prior to
the ADAAA, both the case law and the scholarship concerning the ADA focused
overwhelmingly on that threshold test because few plaintiffs had the opportunity
34
to litigate any other issue. Today, however, as litigation of other aspects of the
35
ADA becomes more frequent, they deserve further scrutiny. As exemplified in
John’s predicament, the remedies available under the ADA are often insufficient
to overcome the additional disincentives against enforcement faced by employees

26. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54 (2008)
(expressly stating the intent to define “disability” broadly).
27. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
28. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 2009).
30. Parikh, supra note 24, at 740–41 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488).
31. Id. at 741; see also Goldstein, supra note 24, at 944–45 (further discussing essential job functions that
are impaired by an untreated mental illness, leading courts to declare that plaintiffs are “not otherwise
qualified”).
32. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
33. Id. § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553–54. The amended statute requires that disabilities be considered in their
unmitigated state, that disabilities that are “episodic or in remission” should be considered in their active state,
and that the ADA should generally be interpreted as having broad coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (Supp. II
2009).
34. See Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L.J. 187,
188 (2010) (“Although courts encountered these interpretive questions prior to the ADAAA, they have not yet
fully resolved these issues due to the scarcity of ADA cases that proceeded past the initial question of the
plaintiff’s standing to sue.”).
35. Id. at 188–89.
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with invisible and highly stigmatized disabilities, such as mental illness. These
disincentives against litigation cause rational employers to refuse to settle
disputes out of court, in turn leaving employees litigation as the sole avenue for
37
obtaining relief. This Comment argues that a consistently available
compensatory damages remedy is necessary to provide meaningful protection for
both the employment rights and privacy of employees with psychiatric
disabilities, and proposes a solution in the use of common-law causes of action.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the ADA and its remedies
for employment discrimination. Part III discusses the characteristics of
psychiatric disabilities and how they affect ADA causes of action and remedies.
Part IV considers the question of why alternative dispute resolution has been
underutilized in psychiatric disability cases, focusing on the EEOC voluntary
mediation program. It then argues that effective remedies are necessary to
encourage employers to negotiate in good faith and agree to mediation or other
forms of settlement. Part V is a multi-part proposal to provide disability
discrimination plaintiffs who have psychiatric disabilities with meaningful
remedies and to encourage defendants to negotiate settlements in good faith. It
explores the use of the characteristics of psychiatric disabilities to sustain
common-law claims as a means of creating the necessary incentives to enforce
the ADA. It examines several specific tort claims that may be particularly viable
for psychiatric disability discrimination: negligent infliction of emotional
distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge
against public policy. It also examines the remedy of front pay as an option, and
proposes policy changes to promote mediation.
II. THE ADA’S EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS: AN OVERVIEW
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA) is the main federal statute
38
protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination. This Par5t will provide
background information on the ADA. It will discuss the general statutory
39
framework, the direct threat exception that frequently comes into play in
40
41
psychiatric disability discrimination cases, remedies available under the ADA,

36. See infra Part III (discussing the insufficiency of the ADA’s remedial structure for people with
psychiatric disabilities).
37. See infra Part IV.B (discussing reasons for employer refusal to engage in alternative dispute
resolution).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (2006); John Parry, Civil Mental Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony
41 (2010).
39. See infra Part II.A.
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. See infra Part II.C.-D.
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and recent legislation that may bring questions about ADA remedies to the
42
forefront of litigation.
A. The Statutory Framework
Title I of the ADA, the portion concerning employment discrimination,
applies broadly to employers with fifteen or more employees, with the exception
of the federal government, corporations wholly owned by the federal
43
government, and Indian tribes. Employers subject to the ADA are prohibited
from discriminating “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
44
and privileges of employment.” The protected class of employees includes
persons with “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities,” persons with “a record of” or “regarded as having”
45
such an impairment, and persons who have a known “relationship or
46
association” with an individual with a disability.
The ADA differs from other civil rights statutes in that it places an
affirmative duty on employers to reasonably accommodate an employee’s
47
disability. This requirement is closely related to the ADA’s criterion of
“qualified” in defining the protected class: a “qualified person” is one who can
perform all essential job functions with accommodations that are reasonable in
48
extent. The employer has an affirmative duty to make a reasonable effort to
determine such an accommodation through an “interactive process” with the
49
employee with a disability.

42. See infra Part II.E.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2006). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits employment discrimination by
the federal government and by organizations receiving federal grants or contracts. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793–794
(2006). The Rehabilitation Act defines “disability” somewhat differently from the ADA. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20).
However, because the Rehabilitation Act has been amended to incorporate the ADA’s standards of proof for
employment discrimination, id. §§ 791(g), 793(e), 794(d), and both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
incorporate by reference the remedies of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this Comment’s analysis of ADA
remedies applies to Rehabilitation Act actions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 794a(a), 12117(a).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
45. Id. § 12102(1).
46. Id. § 12112(b)(4).
47. Id. § 12112(b)(5).
48. Id. § 12111(8).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2012). Although the regulation uses the words “may be necessary,” rather
than mandatory terms, courts have consistently held that the interactive process is mandatory. Kleiber v. Honda
of America Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing numerous cases from other circuits).
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B. The Direct Threat Exception
The ADA contains an exception that is particularly relevant in psychiatric
disability cases: an individual who poses “a direct threat to the health or safety of
50
other individuals in the workplace” is excluded from the protected class.
The direct threat provision demands an individualized assessment of risk that
considers both the specific circumstances and whether the risk can be mitigated
51
52
by reasonable accommodations. The assessment must be entirely objective and
“based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
53
knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” In School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting a similar
direct threat provision in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as applied to a
schoolteacher discharged on the basis of a diagnosis of tuberculosis, stated that
“[t]he Act is carefully structured to replace such reflexive reactions to actual or
perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound
54
judgments . . . .” When Congress enacted the ADA, numerous congressional
committees expressed the intent that the Arline standard should be applied to the
55
direct threat provision in the ADA; the Supreme Court later applied that
56
standard to ADA direct threat analysis in Bragdon v. Abbott. In holding that a
dentist’s refusal to treat an HIV-positive patient in his office due to a perceived
risk of transmission violated the ADA, the Court emphasized that a risk must be
57
58
significant, and not merely speculative, to constitute a direct threat.
Because existence of a direct threat is an affirmative defense, the employer
has the burden of proving that it found the employee to pose a direct threat
through an objective, individualized inquiry complying with the Arline

50. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
51. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). Although this case was decided before the
enactment of the ADA, the “direct threat” provision in the Rehabilitation Act that the Court interpreted was
substantially similar to that found in the ADA. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(D) (2006) (excluding individuals who
“would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals”). The ADA also expressly defines
“direct threat” as including only “significant risk” that “cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”
42 U.S.C. § 12111(3).
52. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Such an analysis . . . disallows
reliance on subjective evaluations . . . .”).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see also Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the opinions of physicians outside the specialty associated with the employee’s disability are
insufficient to establish that an employer has made the required direct threat assessment).
54. 480 U.S. at 284–85.
55. Hubbard, supra note 17, at 862, 862 n.44.
56. 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998).
57. Id. (“Because few, if any, activities in life are risk free, Arline and the ADA do not ask whether a risk
exists, but whether it is significant.”).
58. Id. at 653 (observing that the petitioner’s assertion that dentists risked contracting HIV from patients
was based only on “the absence of contrary evidence, not on positive data.”).
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59

standard. In the specific context of psychiatric disabilities, the employer’s
individualized inquiry must identify specific behavior on the part of the
60
employee that would create a direct threat.
C. ADA Causes of Action and Remedies
As with other antidiscrimination statutes, plaintiffs may sue under a theory of
61
disparate treatment or disparate impact. In addition, a third cause of action
62
exists for failure to accommodate a disability.
Disparate treatment, as its plain-language meaning suggests, occurs when a
plaintiff is treated differently from others similarly situated “because of, not
63
merely in spite of,” membership in an identifiable protected class. The plaintiff
must prove the defendant’s subjective discriminatory intent; in most civil rights
contexts, the terms “disparate treatment” and “intentional discrimination” are
64
used interchangeably.
Discrimination need not be intentional to be unlawful, however. Since 1971,
the courts have recognized that antidiscrimination statutes prohibit “practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation,” a theory that has come to be
65
known as disparate impact. Although the disparate impact theory was created
judicially in the general antidiscrimination paradigm, it is expressly codified in
66
Title I of the ADA. The ADA prohibits employment policies or practices that
67
“have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability,” and also prohibits
“qualification standards . . . that screen out or tend to screen out” individuals with
disabilities unless the standard is “job-related for the position in question” and
68
“consistent with business necessity.”
Failure to accommodate occurs when an employer denies the employee a
reasonable accommodation or denies an employment opportunity to avoid the

59. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999). This interpretation is reflected
in the EEOC’s interpretive guidance. 29 C.F.R. 1630, App. § 1630.15(b)–(c) (2012) (“[A]n employer must
demonstrate that the requirement, applied to the individual, satisfies the direct threat standard in §
1630.2(r) . . . .”). However, at least one other circuit has contested this interpretation. Hubbard, supra note 17, at
865, 865 n.52 (citing Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996)).
60. Hubbard, supra note 17, at 864–65 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 57 (1990)).
61. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2006).
63. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Statutory language implies the same, defining “intentional discrimination” as unlawful discrimination
that is “not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2).
65. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3), (6).
67. Id. § 12112(b)(3).
68. Id. § 12112(b)(6).
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duty to provide an accommodation. An employer is not liable when
70
accommodating the employee’s disability would cause “undue hardship.”
The ADA incorporates by reference the remedies listed in the Civil Rights
71
Act of 1964. This creates a three-tiered system of remedies in employment
72
cases: equitable relief in all cases, compensatory damages for intentional
73
discrimination, and punitive damages only when the defendant acted
maliciously or with “reckless indifference” to the plaintiff’s federally protected
74
rights. Compensatory damages are capped at a level determined by the
75
employer’s size. Where the plaintiff’s cause of action is failure to accommodate
a disability, compensatory damages are awarded only where the employer acts in
76
bad faith.
Equitable relief typically consists of injunctive relief and any back pay the
77
employer owes. Pursuant to statute, back pay is considered an equitable remedy
78
rather than an element of compensatory damages. In addition, a prevailing
79
plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees.
D. Administrative Procedure
Like other employment discrimination plaintiffs, ADA Title I plaintiffs must
80
exhaust administrative remedies. A person alleging disability discrimination
must first file an administrative charge with the EEOC or one of its state or local
81
counterparts. The EEOC may bring a civil action or attempt to negotiate a

69. Id. § 12112(b)(5).
70. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Whether an accommodation imposes an “undue hardship” is a question of fact,
depending on factors including the nature and cost of the accommodation, the effect of accommodation on the
employee’s work site, the employer’s financial resources, and the types of operations in which the employer is
engaged. Id. § 12111(10).
71. Id. § 12117(a).
72. Id. § 2000e-5(g). The equitable relief to which plaintiffs are entitled “may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay” as well as an injunction against the unlawful
employment practice alleged in the complaint. Id.
73. Id. § 1981a(a)(2).
74. Id. § 1981a(b)(1). An employer acts with reckless indifference when discriminating “in the face of a
perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law . . . .” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536
(1999).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
76. Id. § 1981a(a)(3).
77. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
78. Id. §§ 1981a(b)(2), 2000e-5(g)(1).
79. Id. § 2000e-5(k).
80. SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN
FEDERAL COURT 42 (2005).
81. Id.

999

_06_HSIEH_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:42 AM

2013 / The Catch-22 of ADA Title I Remedies for Psychiatric Disabilities
82

settlement on the claimant’s behalf. The person alleging discrimination may
83
only file a private lawsuit if the EEOC issues a right-to-sue notice.
Despite the existence of an administrative enforcement mechanism, private
84
lawsuits remain a critical component of enforcing the ADA. “Civil rights laws
depend on the private bar for their enforcement. Government enforcers have
limited resources in the best of times . . . . Public interest groups, moreover, have
85
far too limited resources to fill in the gap . . . .” Because the EEOC only has the
resources to sue employers in a fraction of the potentially meritorious disability
discrimination claims received each year, it tends to focus its attention on cases
86
that appear strongest or have high precedential value. In addition, critics have
noted that the EEOC and other executive agencies often decline to litigate
87
“legally sound but politically touchy enforcement actions.” Because of its
limited resources, the EEOC issues right-to-sue letters in the vast majority of
88
apparently meritorious cases, leaving enforcement to private litigants.
E. The ADA Amendments Act: Changing the Face of ADA Litigation
For many years, a great majority of ADA Title I plaintiffs failed to establish
a prima facie case specifically because they were unable to prove membership in

82. 29 C.F.R. §§1601.24, 1601.27 (2012).
83. Id. § 1601.28.
84. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA
Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 35 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Limited Remedies]; see also MEZEY, supra
note 80, at 172 (describing a general consensus among disability rights advocates that the threat of litigation has
been the main driver of ADA compliance).
85. Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 35.
86. Claims that the EEOC fully investigates and litigates tend to “involve pattern or practice/systemic
issues or other public policy concerns that call for public adjudication.” Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to
Remedy Civil Rights Violations When the Defendant Is Not an Intentional Perpetrator: The Problems of
Unconscious Disparate Treatment and Unjustified Disparate Impacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 225,
257 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). In addition, “the easiest cases resolve at the EEOC level.” Michael E.
Waterstone et al., Disability Cause Lawyers, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1287, 1314 (2012).
87. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys General, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1459,
1461 (2007).
88. See Enforcement and Litigation Statistics: Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges,
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2013) (listing numbers of ADA charges filed from 1997 through 2012 and breaking them down
by type of resolution) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). In 2010, the EEOC found 1,186 ADA claims to
have reasonable cause at the conclusion of investigation; in 747 of these it was unable to reach a settlement with
the employer. Id. In that year, it filed forty-one ADA suits, which represents just one-in-eighteen of the
unresolved claims it found to have merit. EEOC Litigation Statistics, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). Private litigation has been the primary means of enforcement of antidiscrimination
statutes since they were first enacted; between 1972 and 1989 the EEOC filed less than four percent of
employment discrimination lawsuits. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1000 n.66 (1991).
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the protected class of qualified individuals with disabilities. Courts tended to
construe the definition of “disability” extremely narrowly on several different
grounds. First, in Sutton v. United Airlines, the Supreme Court held that two
pilots denied employment for having severe myopia were not disabled because
90
they had normal or better eyesight with corrective lenses. Its holding required
courts to consider a disability in its mitigated state, which created particular
difficulties for individuals with well-controlled psychiatric disabilities who might
91
nevertheless face discrimination in the workplace. Second, courts often found
that a psychiatric illness did not constitute a disability under the ADA because it
92
did not limit “a major life activity.” Third, some courts read the words
“substantially limit” as requiring that the putative disability have a pervasive,
long-term impact, which excludes many psychiatric illnesses that affect patients
93
episodically. Finally, the Sutton Court construed the “regarded as” prong of the
disability definition so narrowly as to eliminate virtually all claims relying on
that prong, by holding that people who were regarded as limited, but not regarded
94
as “substantially limited,” were not protected.
In 2008, Congress overruled these judicial precedents by enacting the ADA
95
Amendments Act. The ADAAA expanded the definition of “disability” by
inserting language expressly stating that disabilities are to be considered in their
unmitigated state, stating that conditions that were “episodic or in remission” are
to be considered in their active state, and codifying broad readings of
96
“substantially limits” and “major life activity.” It clarified that an individual is
“regarded as” disabled if he or she is regarded as having any impairment
“whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
97
activity.” In its findings, Congress listed its disapproval of Sutton and other
cases limiting the definition of “disability” among its reasons for amending the
98
ADA.
89. Center & Imparato, supra note 24, at 325–26.
90. 527 U.S. 471, 482–83, 487 (1999).
91. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 36. Numerous courts subsequently used exactly this reasoning to determine
that psychiatric disabilities that were controlled by medication were not disabilities under the ADA. Id. at 37;
Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 122–23.
92. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 74–75; Korn, supra note 17, at 641–42; see, e.g., Reeves v. Johnson
Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the impairment of plaintiff’s everyday
mobility by panic disorder did not limit a major life activity because it did not prevent the plaintiff from
commuting to work); Breiland v. Advance Circuits, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Minn. 1997) (holding that
“inability to get along with others” is not a “major life activity”).
93. See, e.g., Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant because plaintiff had not shown “that he had a continuing inability to handle stress at all times, rather
than only episodically”).
94. Center & Imparato, supra note 24, at 326 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490–91).
95. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (Supp. II 2009).
97. Id. § 12102(3)(A).
98. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54 (2008).
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Prior to the ADAAA, very little of the extant ADA case law and scholarship
concerned issues other than the definition of disability because few cases
proceeded beyond the threshold question of the plaintiff’s membership in the
99
protected class. By expanding the definition of disability, the ADAAA
increased the likelihood that a disability discrimination case could proceed
100
beyond that initial stage of analysis. It is for this reason that this Comment
focuses on remedies.
III. ADA ENFORCEMENT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES
Empirically, enforcing the ADA has been particularly difficult for plaintiffs
101
with psychiatric disabilities. Why is this the case?
This Part first discusses the characteristics that differentiate psychiatric
102
disabilities from other disabilities, then explores three ways in which these
differences affect ADA enforcement: (1) plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities
103
face greater difficulty proving discriminatory intent; (2) the equitable relief that
is available without proof of intentional discrimination is particularly ineffective
104
for employees with psychiatric disabilities; (3) and concerns about privacy,
along with other aspects of psychiatric illnesses, deter victims of psychiatric
105
disability discrimination from seeking relief.
A. What Makes Psychiatric Disabilities Different?
The stereotypes surrounding psychiatric disabilities differ from those relating
106
to other forms of disability. Whereas attitudes about other disabilities tend
toward either paternalism or doubt about an individual’s productivity, people
with psychiatric disabilities are more often viewed with fear and seen as a danger
107
to those around them. Media portrayals of people with psychiatric disabilities
108
as prone to violence feed this stereotype. Where employers might view a

99. See Cox, supra note 34, at 188 (“Although courts encountered these interpretive questions prior to the
ADAAA, they have not yet fully resolved these issues due to the scarcity of ADA cases that proceeded past the
initial question of the plaintiff’s standing to sue.”).
100. Id. at 188–89.
101. Swanson et al., supra note 22.
102. See infra Part III.A.
103. See infra Part III.B.
104. See infra Part III.C.
105. See infra Part III.D.
106. Hubbard, supra note 17, at 850.
107. Id.
108. Korn, supra note 17, at 608 (observing that news articles about violent crimes often cite the alleged
criminal’s history of mental illness and that most film and television characters with mental illness are portrayed
as violent).
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person with a “physical” disability as incurring an acceptable economic burden,
they might view a person with a psychiatric disability as posing a non110
quantifiable, unacceptable risk.
111
Psychiatric disabilities are manifested primarily in behavior. For this
reason, they are particularly susceptible to facially neutral workplace rules or
policies that have a disproportionate impact on—and may even be devised to
112
remove—people with psychiatric disabilities.
Particularly common are
113
violence-prevention measures that involve behavioral profiling. At other times,
workplace policies may err far on the side of removing perceived safety risks,
114
even when the degree of risk is remote or nonexistent. Some people who have
disclosed psychiatric disabilities to their employers report that they are held to
higher behavioral standards than non-disabled coworkers; emotional reactions
that would otherwise pass without remark are seen as signs that the person is
115
losing control.
On the other hand, psychiatric disabilities are also often invisible unless
116
disclosed. Symptoms may not be readily apparent in the workplace because
they are well-managed or the person with the disability “self-accommodates” to

109. See generally SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 59–60, 67–68 (2009) [hereinafter BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS] (discussing the
prohibition on statistically-based “rational discrimination” and characterizing the ADA’s accommodation
mandate as imposing acceptable costs on employers).
110. See Hensel & Jones, supra note 18, at 71 (citing OTTO F. WAHL, TELLING IS RISKY BUSINESS:
MENTAL HEALTH CONSUMERS CONFRONT STIGMA 84–85 (1999)) (“60% of personnel directors ‘would never
choose an individual with mental illness for an executive job,’ compared with just 3% who would not hire a
person with diabetes.”); see also Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 228–29 (citing Colbert et al., supra
note 20) (finding that employers viewed “mental instability” more negatively than a variety of other
characteristics, including physical disability and even time spent in prison).
111. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 154.
112. See id. at 155 (“These seemingly neutral rules may be devised precisely to ensure the removal of
employees . . . who are not in the least threatening, but whose disability-related behavior nevertheless makes
fellow employees uncomfortable.”). The courts have recognized that the strict application of such rules may
constitute disparate impact discrimination. See Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir.
1997) (observing that some accommodation for disability-caused conduct is necessary because not doing so
would render the ADA meaningless for disabilities that manifest themselves behaviorally).
113. Korn, supra note 17, at 614–15. The degree to which behavioral profiling is socially accepted might
best be demonstrated by one advertisement for a 1995 seminar that promised to teach employers how to “avoid
hiring lemons, nuts and flakes.” Hubbard, supra note 17, at 903 n.218.
114. In employment discrimination cases, behavior cited by the employer as “misconduct” has ranged
from actual threats or sexual harassment to mere eccentric behavior. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 153–54. Some
institutions have implemented policies broadly prohibiting conduct that merely creates a perception of danger.
See, e.g., CECIL CNTY. GOV’T, PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 62 (rev. 2011), available at
www.ccgov.org/uploads/HR/P_PManual2011.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (prohibiting
“behavior that creates a fear of injury to another person”). Employers, courts, and regulators alike often share a
“zero-risk mentality that leads people to demand an elimination of all risk.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1494–95, 1506 (2001).
115. Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 232.
116. Id. at 229.
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perform the functions of the job. Employers typically see the symptoms only in
the form of “common personality traits” such as “the inability to tolerate stress,
difficulties with interpersonal and social relationships, and periodic difficulties in
118
focusing and concentration.” Even where the disability manifests itself as
unusual conduct, it is often not readily apparent that such conduct is the result of
119
a psychiatric disability.
Because psychiatric disabilities tend to be invisible, the stigma surrounding
120
them has been particularly difficult to dispel. Civil rights laws have been more
effective in destigmatizing other marginalized groups through contact in
121
workplaces and other public venues. But the contact theory may not work
similarly for psychiatric and other invisible disabilities; coworkers are not
exposed to people with disabilities as long as the disability remains undisclosed,
122
and disclosure itself has been known to stigmatize individuals. Although
advocacy groups have made significant progress in increasing the public’s
understanding of psychiatric disabilities, these efforts tend to operate at a
123
conscious level and have not necessarily altered unconscious stereotypes. As a
result, the public continues to view psychiatric disabilities as somehow more
124
worthy of fear and less deserving of accommodation than other disabilities.
B. Problems with Discriminatory Intent
Empirically, prevailing plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities are less likely
to be awarded monetary damages than prevailing plaintiffs with other types of

117. Id. at 230. Campbell and Kaufmann quote several employees with disabilities who make this
observation. Id. “I’m accommodating all the time, but they don’t know or realize it,” one said. Id. Another
experienced psychotic symptoms that others in the workplace noticed only in the form of the resulting fatigue.
Id.
118. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 63.
119. See id. at 153–54 (describing examples of alleged employee “misconduct” seen in disability
discrimination cases, most of which would not automatically create the impression of a psychiatric disability);
Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 223 (observing that psychiatric disabilities “manifest themselves
through behavior that may appear to be voluntary”).
120. Goldberg et al., supra note 2, at 494.
121. Michael E. Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Disabling Prejudice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1351,
1366 (2008). But see BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 109, at 2 (noting the “inherent
limitations of antidiscrimination laws” in combating social stigma).
122. Goldberg et al., supra note 2, at 494; see also Nancy Hall, Mental Illness + Workplace Violence, 13
VISIONS: BC’S MENTAL HEALTH J. 7 (Fall/Winter 2001) (citing a Canadian study that found that eight in ten
workers report discrimination following disclosure of a psychiatric disability).
123. See Sadie F. Dingfelder, Stigma: Alive and Well, 40 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 56 (2006), available at
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/06/stigma.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (observing that most
anti-stigma campaigns “convey the message that mental illness is a disease like any other” and “focus on the
prevalence and symptoms of mental illness”).
124. This is even true of behavioral manifestations of disabilities. See Korn, supra note 17, at 607–08
(observing that the public tends to be more understanding with, and that employers are more likely to
accommodate, behavioral changes that are associated with “physical” disabilities).
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Because an award of compensatory damages requires
disabilities.
126
discriminatory intent, the higher frequency at which plaintiffs with psychiatric
disabilities receive purely equitable remedies suggests that courts are less likely
to find intent even when they find that some form of unlawful discrimination
occurred.
The prima facie case for proof of intentional discrimination, articulated in
127
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, applies to disparate treatment claims under the
128
ADA. Historically, disability discrimination plaintiffs most often failed to make
a prima facie case because they could not prove the necessary element of
129
membership in the ADA’s protected class. With the passage of the ADAAA,
which greatly explanded the protected class by defining disability more broadly,
130
more plaintiffs are able to survive summary judgment. Still, after both sides
have met their burdens of production, the plaintiff retains the burden of proving
131
discriminatory intent. This is true whether the plaintiff chooses to attack the
132
defendant’s proffered reason as pretext or to attempt to prove mixed motive.
In practice, “intentional discrimination” has been narrowly defined, with
lower courts sometimes incorrectly requiring some evidence of active dislike or
133
ill-will toward the plaintiff’s class. This misunderstanding of intent may
particularly disadvantage plaintiffs with disabilities, as society greatly
134
underestimates the prevalence of animus toward persons with disabilities. The
125. Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 108.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006).
127. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
128. E.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (applying McDonnell Douglas analysis to
determine burdens of production in an ADA claim).
129. Center & Imparato, supra note 24, at 325–26.
130. Cox, supra note 34, at 188–89.
131. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–56 (1981) (holding that the defendant’s
production of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason rebuts the plaintiff’s prima facie case, and the plaintiff’s
burden to demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.”).
132. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2003) (explaining that the plaintiff must “meet
the burdens of production and persuasion” in demonstrating “that an employer used a forbidden consideration,”
regardless of whether it is a pretext or mixed-motive case).
133. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 776–80
(2006) (arguing that the existence of the disparate impact theory “led to judicial neglect of the disparate
treatment theory, and also created the false impression that disparate treatment equaled animus”). Intentional
discrimination means consciously making decisions on the basis of the protected characteristic, as described in
the classic “because of, not merely in spite of” formulation. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). The actor need not bear any hostility toward the adversely affected
class; animus is merely evidence of intent. Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive
Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 501–02 (2001)
(discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding animus).
134. See generally MARK SHERRY, DISABILITY HATE CRIMES: DOES ANYONE REALLY HATE DISABLED
PEOPLE? (2010) (arguing that animus against persons with disabilities is greatly underestimated). Professor
Sherry found disbelief in the existence of animus against persons with disabilities among audiences at his own
speeches, id. at xiv, in mainstream newspapers, id. at 29, and even in at least one British government report, id.
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myth that disability-based animus does not exist may have an even greater impact
on plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities, as animus toward persons with
135
psychiatric disabilities is especially prevalent.
But even the fact that intentional discrimination does not require animus is of
little comfort. Although the Supreme Court unambiguously stated in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins that acting on a stereotype is a form of intentional
136
discrimination, that holding is useful in proving intent only where the
137
stereotype has been expressed in some way. Misjudgments and rash decisions
alone do not sufficiently support an inference of discriminatory intent; the
plaintiff must still somehow prove that the employer was acting on a
138
stereotype. In fact, the problem of stereotyping without clear expression has led
some legal realists to characterize the disparate impact theory, which does not
require proof of intent, as an “evidentiary dragnet” used to ferret out hidden
139
discriminatory intent. Perhaps more worrisome for plaintiffs with psychiatric
disabilities, the assertion that an employer is acting on a stereotype may even be
140
dismissed out of hand by a court that happens to accept the stereotype as truth.
In addition, employers’ stereotypes frequently play out unconsciously, where
141
they might be inferred only from a long-term pattern of behavior. “These
stereotypes are not conscious in the sense that the actors express a belief . . . and
if one were asked, they would almost certainly deny any such belief. But their

at 52–53. The same myth may exist in the legal system as well. See id. at 82–83 (suggesting that American
prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute crimes against persons with disabilities as hate crimes because they do not
consider animus to be a likely motive).
135. See id. at 41–42 (describing “an informal disability hierarchy underpinning antidisability websites”
in which “people with cognitive impairments and psychiatric impairments are located at the bottom of
humanity.”).
136. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (“[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”).
137. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on
State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1164–66 (2007) (citing several
commentators who assert that the disparate impact theory is necessary to uncover hidden intent). In Price
Waterhouse, the stereotypes were expressly stated; no inference was necessary. 490 U.S. at 235.
138. See Selmi, supra note 133, at 706 (noting the difficulty of proving intent where “evidence of overt
bias or animus is lacking”).
139. Seicshnaydre, supra note 137, at 1164–66.
140. Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment
Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 272–73 (2000) (describing
several cases). Particularly where the direct threat exception is involved, some court opinions have been so
conclusory about the plaintiff’s condition as to imply that the court accepts the stereotype as true. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.3d 500, 513 (1999) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Paranoid schizophrenia
often entails the sort of violent outbursts . . . that an employer need not accommodate.”); Hubbard, supra note
17, at 921–22 (discussing Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty, 905 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1995) and criticizing the
court’s evidence-free assumption about the plaintiff’s “inability to control her behavior.”).
141. See Selmi, supra note 133, at 778–79 (“Because subtle discrimination is not fueled by a conscious
motive or any express animus, there has been a struggle . . . to determine whether existing proof structures can
accommodate the changed nature of discrimination . . . .”).
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actions indicate otherwise . . . .” Policies and procedures that allow subjective
criteria, and thus unconscious stereotypes, to play an excessive role in
143
employment decisions may constitute disparate impact discrimination. Whether
unconscious stereotyping rise to the level of intentional discrimination remains a
144
subject of heated debate in academic circles, but in practice courts have
145
generally limited intentional discrimination to conscious intent. This limitation
particularly disadvantages psychiatric disability discrimination plaintiffs because
psychiatric disability discrimination so frequently takes the form of risk
146
assessments colored by commonly accepted stereotypes.
The ADA analysis is further complicated in that its accommodation
requirement, its exceptions, and the diversity of disabilities all blur the lines
147
between disparate treatment and disparate impact. The direct threat exception,
properly seen as an exception to the protected class due to its description as a
permitted qualification standard, allows an employer to consider the employee’s
disability; and the accommodation requirement requires an employer to act
148
because of an employee’s disability. Both present ways for an employer to
consciously act because of a disability without overt discriminatory intent, and
149
even invite some degree of unconscious stereotyping.
142. Id. at 779.
143. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988) (holding that promotion criteria
depending on an “undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking” could constitute disparate impact
discrimination).
144. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 514–15
(2d. ed. 2011).
145. White & Krieger, supra note 133, at 506. At least one federal court, while using this approach, has
expressed reservations about it. Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala.
2004) (“Such subjective decision-making processes are particularly susceptible to being influenced not by overt
bigotry and hatred, but rather by unexamined assumptions about others that the decisionmaker may not even be
aware of—hence the difficulty of ferreting out discrimination as a motivating factor.”).
146. Hubbard, supra note 17, at 921 (explaining how stereotypes of mental illness may affect the
objectivity of a direct threat assessment).
147. See James Leonard, The Equity Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights Concepts Has
Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2005) (observing that disparate
impact claims under Title I of the ADA often involve individual discrimination that closely resembles disparate
treatment or failure to accommodate); see also Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable
Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 71 (2008) (noting
significant uncertainty and debate in the relationship between accommodation and nondiscrimination in the
ADA).
148. See Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation Difference: The Effect of Applying
the Burden-Shifting Frameworks Developed Under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought
Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98 (1997) (arguing that
the traditional framework of proof for intentional discrimination breaks down in ADA cases where the disability
is part of the employer’s proffered justification); see also Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 987 (11th Cir.
1992) (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (“Because handicapped people are entitled by law to preferential treatment . . .
necessary to afford them equal access to housing, a disparate impact analysis is useless in this context and in
fact negates the entire intent of including handicapped people within the FHAA.”)
149. See Basas, supra note 147, at 102, 109–10 (arguing that the ADA, by allowing employers to engage
in cost analysis, invites employers to “[indulge] in some slippery rounds of the worst case scenario game” and
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The lines are particularly blurry for psychiatric disabilities that manifest
through behavior; the types of discrimination to which psychiatric disabilities are
most susceptible defy easy characterization within any of the three recognized
150
causes of action, and may arguably be any of the three. When an employer
removes a person with a psychiatric disability for “endangering conduct,” for
example, then all three theories are in play. The employee’s diagnosis may be a
151
conscious motivating factor, which would constitute intentional discrimination.
On the other hand, the removal could be the result of a policy that fails to make
an adequate assessment of dangerousness and allows completely unconscious
bias to play too much of a role in the process, which would constitute disparate
152
impact discrimination. Finally, psychiatric disabilities that manifest themselves
as behavior may require accommodation in the form of modification of
153
workplace rules or policies, and employers must consider whether a reasonable
154
accommodation can mitigate a direct threat. The affirmative duty to engage
directly with the employee to determine an appropriate accommodation arguably
does not disappear when the employer suspects a direct threat to workplace
155
safety. An omission in any of these affirmative duties constitutes failure to

allows “reasonable” to become a proxy for unconscious bias).
150. See STEFAN, supra note 16, at 155 (noting that psychiatric disabilities are particularly susceptible to
discriminatory application of workplace conduct rules and related policies).
151. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (establishing the mixed motives standard).
152. Because the direct threat exception requires an objective, individualized, and medically sound
assessment, a policy that fails to make such an assessment is clearly unlawful. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–85, 287 (1987). However, such a policy does not necessarily reflect any
discriminatory motive. Even where unconscious bias is involved in the decision-making process, whether it
constitutes discriminatory intent is uncertain. GLYNN ET AL., supra note 144, at 514–15; see also Thomas v.
Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (describing subjective decision-making
processes as “particularly susceptible to being influenced” by unconscious bias without discriminatory intent).
153. See Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 1997) (observing that some
accommodation for disability-caused conduct is necessary because not doing so would render the ADA
meaningless for disabilities that manifest themselves behaviorally).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2006) (defining “direct threat” as “a significant risk . . . that cannot be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation”). The employer always carries the burden to prove inability to
reasonably accommodate a disability. Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 310 (Former 5th Cir. Nov.
1981). Arguably, a failure to consider accommodations could be probative of the alleged direct threat being a
pretext for intentional discrimination, but that argument does not appear to have been brought in litigation to
date. See Kera Croteau, Comment, Lack of Unity in ADA Decisions Leaves Bipolar Sufferers Unprotected and
Employers Confused, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 1059, 1084 (2006) (stating the inverse, that efforts to accommodate a
disability are probative of the credibility of a proffered legitimate reason).
155. Tory L. Lucas, So What If I’m Gonna Hurt Myself: The ADA’s Direct Threat Defense, NEB. LAW.,
Sept. 2003, at 7, 15. No court has considered the question on whether the interactive process is still mandatory
when an employee may pose a direct threat to health or safety. See Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 336 F.3d
1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). However, on a number of occasions, courts have accepted without argument that the
interactive process is mandatory regardless of circumstances. E.g., Reinhardt v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe
R.R., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1114 & n.4 (D. Mont. 2012); EEOC v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 720 F. Supp. 2d
1073, 1083 (D. Minn. 2010); French v. Providence Everett Medical Center, No. C07-0217RSL, 2008 WL
4186538, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 2008).
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accommodate. Plaintiffs often plead all three of the claims available under the
157
ADA.
Inevitably, the blurring between the various ADA causes of action leaves
situations in which plaintiffs may reasonably plead discriminatory intent but
158
expect to prevail only on other theories.
These situations arise
159
disproportionately often in psychiatric disability discrimination cases. Often, an
employer does not act with intent to discriminate, but instead fails to act on an
affirmative duty (arising from the ADA’s reasonable accommodation mandate
160
and direct threat exception) to avoid unnecessary discrimination. Between
society’s reluctance to find disability-based animus and the particular likelihood
that psychiatric disability discrimination falls into the gray areas between
disparate treatment and disparate impact causes of action, plaintiffs with
psychiatric disabilities may receive only equitable relief. This is likely even when
defendants’ conduct is more culpable than that typically associated with disparate
impact discrimination.
C. Equitable Relief and its Limitations
Equitable relief is generally limited to reinstatement, injunctive relief as
161
needed, and back pay.
Courts have some discretion to award “front pay” for a reasonable period of
time, if the plaintiff has been discharged and reinstatement is not feasible due to
“continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or
because of psychological injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the
162
163
discrimination.” However, front pay is rarely awarded; a court must

156. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).
157. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (holding that disparate treatment and
disparate impact discrimination are separate claims that must be pled separately in a complaint).
158. See STEFAN, supra note 16, at 153–55 (noting that psychiatric disabilites are particularly susceptible
to being penalized as “misconduct,” leaving open the question of whether the employer acted because of the
disability or pursuant to a facially-neutral policy).
159. See id. at 155 (noting that psychiatric disabilities are particularly susceptible to discriminatory
application of workplace conduct rules and related policies); Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 108 (finding that
prevailing ADA plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities are less likely to receive monetary awards than plaintiffs
with other disabilities).
160. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 109, at 68; see also David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 943–44 (1993) (arguing that the affirmative
duty to reasonably accommodate disabilities essentially prohibits negligent discrimination).
161. See generally supra Part II.C (discussing ADA remedies).
162. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001). Front pay, which is money
awarded to replace lost post-judgment compensation, is considered an equitable remedy rather than
compensatory damages. Id. at 846, 852.
163. See EEOC v. Century Broad. Corp., 957 F.2d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that if “hostility
common to litigation” justified a front pay award, “reinstatement would cease to be a remedy except in cases
where the defendant felt like reinstating the plaintiff.”).

1009

_06_HSIEH_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:42 AM

2013 / The Catch-22 of ADA Title I Remedies for Psychiatric Disabilities
“carefully articulate its reasons for awarding front pay,” and there must be
unusual circumstances such as hostility in excess of that normally attendant to
164
litigation.
For psychiatric disabilities, the typical remedy of back pay and reinstatement
creates new problems for the prevailing plaintiff: the plaintiff’s disability
becomes known to many more people in the workplace than would have
otherwise been aware of it, creating stigma or hostility in addition to that
165
normally resulting from litigation. Many courts have been reluctant to allow
166
plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities to sue under fictitious names. And even
in the best-case scenario, when a plaintiff is actually able to seal his or her real
name and litigate under a fictitious name, the plaintiff’s coworkers may still
become aware of the lawsuit and the parties’ factual allegations. Although efforts
have been made to destigmatize psychiatric disabilities, and not all coworkers
who learn about an individual’s psychiatric disability react badly, the enduring
167
stigma makes disclosure risky. For some individuals, disclosure of a psychiatric
168
disability is itself traumatic and may lead to exacerbation of the disability. The
169
decision to disclose a psychiatric disability is not made lightly.
For people whose disabilities are not immediately apparent, most of the
situations in which an ADA claim may arise do not involve widespread
170
disclosure of a disability prior to litigation. Adverse employment actions may
be taken by just one person. Although an individual must obviously disclose a
disability to request accommodations, the process of requesting and obtaining

164. Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999). In Farley, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld an award of front pay, finding reinstatement not feasible because the plaintiff’s supervisors and
coworkers had subjected him to persistent verbal abuse and anonymous hate mail related to his mental illness
for four years prior to his termination. Id. The court contrasted Farley’s case from Walther v. Lone Star Gas
Co., in which the Fifth Circuit vacated a front pay award that had been based solely on “protracted and
necessarily vexing” litigation. Id. at 1339–40 (citing Walther, 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992)). The hostility
justifying a front pay award need not be as extreme in severity or duration as in Farley; in one age
discrimination case, a record showing an officer of the defendant corporation referring to one plaintiff as a
“cancer” and making “numerous attacks during the trial on plaintiffs’ abilities” supported the finding that
“plaintiffs and [defendant] could no longer co-exist in a business relationship . . . .” Cancellier v. Federated
Dep’t Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. See supra Part III.A (discussing the stigma surrounding psychiatric disabilities and the frequent
invisibility of psychiatric disabilities in the workplace).
166. Sarah Orme, Note, Justice or Mental Health . . . Should Litigants Have to Choose? Mental Health as
a Reason to Proceed Anonymously, 44 IND. L. REV. 605, 616–17 (2011).
167. See generally Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 229–33. One study found that, whereas job
candidates with visible “physical” disabilities faced relatively little stigma compared to other historically
disadvantaged groups, employers viewed those with psychiatric disabilities even more negatively than
candidates who had spent time in prison. Id. at 228–29 (citing Colbert et al., supra note 20).
168. Orme, supra note 166, at 613.
169. See STEFAN, supra note 16, at 18 (noting that many individuals with psychiatric disabilites decline to
disclose their disabilities even though it means forfeiting legal rights).
170. See generally Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 229–33 (noting that people with psychiatric
disabilities generally attempt to minimize disclosure in the workplace).

1010

_06_HSIEH_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:42 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol.44
171

accommodations does not compel disclosure to more than a few people. Even
after disability discrimination has occurred, the EEOC charge process generally
does not lead to widespread disclosure; an EEOC investigation of an employer
172
typically involves contact with only a few people, and information that the
173
EEOC obtains in the course of its investigation is confidential. Thus, at the time
a person with a psychiatric disability might consider litigation, the majority of the
person’s coworkers might well be completely unaware of the disability.
Conversely, it may become public knowledge after litigation, opening the
174
plaintiff to stigma from many more directions than before.
Even when the disclosure of a psychiatric disability does not cause overt
hostility in the workplace, it subtly alters the way others view a person’s
behavior, as what would otherwise be considered normal emotional responses
175
may be read as manifestations of mental illness. Paradoxically, people with
known psychiatric disabilities must often maintain even greater composure than
their colleagues in order to avoid scrutiny of their mental status, and in turn, their
176
competence or the risk they may pose to workplace safety.
Ultimately, litigation means disclosure of a psychiatric disability, at least
177
within the workplace. As a result, most employment discrimination plaintiffs
with psychiatric disabilities face the prospect of returning to workplaces in which
178
their psychiatric disabilities have become widely known.
D. Psychiatric Disabilities as Barriers to Relief
Because private litigation is such a critical component of ADA enforcement,
people with psychiatric disabilities must choose between enforcing their statutory

171. See PARRY, supra note 38, at 220–23 (describing various accommodations found reasonable for
psychiatric disabilities).
172. See the Charge Handling Process, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.
gov/employers/process.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing ways in
which investigators obtain information); John Costello, EEOC Investigation: What Happens After the Request
for Information?, HR INFO CTR. (May 20, 2009), http://rapidlearninginstitute.com/ hric/eeoc-investigationwhat-happens-after-the-request-for-information/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that on-site
investigations, the most intrusive of investigatory methods, are “not used that frequently”).
173. 42 U.S.C. 42 § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
174. See supra Part III.A (discussing the stigma associated with psychiatric disabilities); see also Sara
Noel, Comment, Parity in Mental Health Coverage: The Goal of Equal Access to Mental Health Treatment
Under the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 and the Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001, 26
HAMLINE L. REV. 377, 405–06 (2003) (arguing that private enforcement of insurance parity laws is flawed
because privacy concerns deter litigation).
175. Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 232.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 165–168 and accompanying text (discussing how litigation exposes a previously
invisible disability).
178. Id.
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rights and keeping their privacy. Although it is true that the exposure of
unsavory facts is part of the cost of litigation, disclosure of a psychiatric
disability has a particularly chilling effect on plaintiffs because it directly
undermines what is often the only available remedy. Essentially, the act of
seeking a remedy renders injunctive relief meaningless by creating widespread
exposure of a psychiatric disability and potentially creating hostility in the
180
workplace. Whereas an injunction for reinstatement or accommodations
improves the position of a plaintiff with visible disabilities, the same remedy, for
plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities, may leave the plaintiff facing worse
discrimination than before, even in the complete absence of any retaliatory
181
motive on the employer’s part.
Psychiatric disabilities also create their own obstacles for potential plaintiffs.
Litigation is inherently extremely stressful, and plaintiffs with psychiatric
disabilities are especially likely to lack the ability to independently litigate a
182
claim. The likely exposure of a psychiatric condition that accompanies
183
litigation can be particularly traumatic in itself. Even when the plaintiffs have
the ability and willingness to litigate, “[m]any lawyers share the prejudices of the
184
population at large,” restricting access to the legal system by stereotyping
potential clients with psychiatric disabilities as lacking capacity or being
185
otherwise “difficult.”

179. See STEFAN, supra note 16, at 18 (noting that many individuals with psychiatric disabilities decline
to disclose their disabilities even though it means forfeiting legal rights); see also Noel, supra note 174, at 405–
06 (suggesting that the possibility of being forced to litigate an insurance parity claim and expose one’s medical
history may deter individuals with mental illness from seeking necessary treatment); cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae
Anti-Defamation League Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir.
Oct. 25, 2010), 2010 WL 4622566 (arguing that separating “domestic partnerships” from marriage
unconstitutionally conditions receipt of ostensibly equal benefits on disclosure of sexual orientation and
resulting exposure to stigma; much like a psychiatric disability, sexual orientation is not readily apparent and its
nondisclosure is a constitutionally protected privacy interest).
180. A hostile work environment will not always arise following reinstatement, of course, but the
prevalence of negative stereotypes of psychiatric disabilities makes it reasonable for a potential litigant to
anticipate some stigmatization. Stigma arising from disclosure of a hidden disability may be entirely separate
from hostility arising from litigation. Even those who fully understand the justification for a lawsuit and bear no
ill-will as a result of the litigation itself may begin to act unconsciously on perceptions of the prevailing
plaintiff’s diagnosis. Campbell & Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 232.
181. See supra Part III.C (discussing reasons reinstatement may not be feasible in psychiatric disability
discrimination cases).
182. See Noel, supra note 174, at 406 (noting that private enforcement of health insurance parity is
difficult because people with mental illness are often unable to endure the stress inherent to litigation). The
argument applies with even greater force to discrimination claims than to health insurance parity claims,
because long-lasting exacerbation of the underlying disability may impair the plaintiff’s ability to litigate until
after the relevant statute of limitations has run. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 15–16 (quoting people for whom
discrimination exacerbated a psychiatric disability for “years”).
183. Orme, supra note 166, at 613.
184. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 26–27.
185. Twitchy Woman, Ableist Attorneys, WEIRDLAW (Feb. 8, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://whoselaw.
wordpress.com/2012/02/08/ableist-attorneys/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing and
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Even in plaintiffs without psychiatric disabilities, “[e]motional distress is a
predictable, and thus foreseeable, consequence” and even “a probable result” of
186
discrimination itself. But discrimination causes particularly severe emotional
187
distress in persons with psychiatric disabilities. “The impact of discrimination
and stigma on a person’s job performance . . . may be more deleterious than the
188
effects of the illness itself.” For many people with serious psychiatric illnesses,
work is a highly effective coping mechanism, and loss of employment deprives a
189
person of that mechanism. Perceived discrimination or rejection has a “startling
190
and disturbing” detrimental influence on depressive symptoms and may lead to
191
social withdrawal. This observation also has a theoretical basis in psychology:
discrimination exacerbates psychiatric disabilities by confirming negative self192
image, acting directly counter to the principles of cognitive-behavioral
193
therapy. One study also suggests that, in addition to directly impacting a
psychiatric disability’s symptoms, perceived stigma negatively affects adherence
194
to medication regimens, indirectly increasing the disability’s severity.
The lack of an effective remedy in many psychiatric disability discrimination
195
cases may further contribute to emotional distress. One survey of disability
discrimination plaintiffs found that, for many litigants with psychiatric

criticizing the frequency with which legal aid organizations refuse to represent clients due to the client’s mental
illness).
186. Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
187. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 15–16 (quoting survey responses). In making this observation, one must
be careful not to equate it with an all-encompassing mental weakness. Discrimination affects specific
vulnerabilities in ways that normal stressors do not. See infra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.
188. John S. Strauss & Larry Davidson, Mental Disorders, Work, and Choice, in MENTAL DISORDER,
WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 105, 126.
189. Saks, supra note 3 (“One of the most frequent mentioned techniques that help our research
participants manage their symptoms was work.”).
190. Bruce G. Link et al., The Consequences of Stigma for the Self-Esteem of People with Mental Illness,
52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1621, 1625 (2001).
191. Id. at 1621–22.
192. Id. at 1622.
193. See Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (July 2012),
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=About_Treatments_and_Supports&template=/ContentManagemen
t/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=7952 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing general principles
of cognitive-behavioral therapy). Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), in which the patient aims to actively
challenge negative thoughts, is highly effective in the treatment of a wide range of psychiatric illnesses. Andrew
C. Butler et al., The Empirical Status of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy: A Review of Meta-Analyses, 26
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 17 (2006).
194. Jo Anne Sirey et al., Perceived Stigma and Patient-Rated Severity of Illness as Predictors of
Antidepressant Drug Adherence, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1615 (2001).
195. See Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 119 (discussing causes of dissatisfaction in litigants with
psychiatric disabilities); Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Appellate Decision-Making in the Context of Disabled
Litigants, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 313, 314 (2000) (“If they depart from their cases feeling demoralized by or
disenfranchised from the process, this can be profoundly counter-therapeutic.”).
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disabilities, “the perception of procedural unfairness adds insult to injury.” A
potential plaintiff, forewarned of the available remedies after seeking legal
197
advice, could reasonably perceive a certain unfairness in the legal framework.
This sense of unfairness might easily add to a perception of stigma, exacerbating
psychiatric symptoms just as the original act of discrimination did before, and
further impairing the potential plaintiff’s ability to litigate an employment
198
discrimination claim.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS
One answer to the privacy concerns inherent in litigation is to use alternative
dispute resolution, which has the advantages of confidentiality and reduced stress
for employees, and may provide negligent employers with a “less guilt-oriented
199
medium to resolve disputes.” Because the EEOC has routinely referred charges
200
to a voluntary mediation program for over a decade, employers are generally
aware of the option of mediation, and parties that were not previously aware of
the option typically know of it by the time they are seriously considering
litigation. Why, then, is alternative dispute resolution not the preferred means of
settling psychiatric disability discrimination claims? This Part examines the
EEOC’s highly effective yet underused voluntary mediation program, and
explores the ways in which employers and the EEOC respectively contribute to
the underuse of the mediation program for psychiatric disability discrimination
charges.
A. The EEOC and Alternative Dispute Resolution
As its caseload has increased over the last two decades, the EEOC has made
increasing use of mediation to resolve disputes, with pilot programs beginning as
early as 1991 and a formal, nationwide voluntary mediation program existing
201
since 1999.

196. Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 119.
197. See supra notes 158–60, 179–81, and accompanying text (noting that the direct threat exception
actually allows an employer to act because of a disability, and that litigation generally means disclosure of a
disability). A plaintiff with a psychiatric disability may view both of these aspects of litigation as disfavoring
litigants with psychiatric disabilities in comparison with other disabilities.
198. See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosure inherent in litigation and
the stigma that accompanies disclosure).
199. Butcher, supra note 86, at 226.
200. See Kathryn Moss et al., Mediation of Employment Discrimination Disputes Involving Persons with
Psychiatric Disabilities, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 988, 988–89 (2002) (discussing the history of the EEOC’s
mediation program).
201. Id.
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The EEOC uses a priority system to streamline its handling of charges.
Upon receipt of a charge, the EEOC assigns the charge to a priority category on
203
the basis of an initial review. The EEOC places in “category A” and fully
investigates charges for which the initial review suggests a high probability that
204
discrimination occurred. “Category B” charges are those for which the EEOC
needs additional evidence to evaluate the merits; the EEOC routinely asks the
employer for its side of the story but conducts further investigation “only as
205
resources permit.” Finally, the system places in “category C” charges that
206
appear to lack merit, and typically, the EEOC quickly dismisses them.
The EEOC’s mediation process focuses on “category B” charges, which may
appear to have some merit on initial review but are extremely unlikely to be
207
selected for litigation. The EEOC refers more than seventy percent of “category
B” charges to its voluntary mediation program, along with a significant minority
208
of “category A” charges and even some “category C” charges. When the EEOC
refers a charge for mediation, it asks both complainants and employers whether
209
they are willing to participate in mediation. Mediation occurs only if both
210
parties agree to participate.
B. The Employer Perspective on Mediation
The EEOC mediation program has been highly successful in reaching
amicable settlements and both employers and employees have reported being
211
highly satisfied. However, it has been of little value to complainants with
psychiatric disabilities because, despite the willingness of most complainants,
212
few employers agree to participate in mediation. Empirically, while the vast
majority of disability discrimination complainants referred to the EEOC
mediation program agree to participate in mediation, only a minority of
213
employers do so. Employers have been even less willing to enter mediation
214
with psychiatric disability cases than with other types of disabilities. Jeffrey
202. Michael D. Ullman et al., The EEOC Charge Priority Policy and Claimants with Psychiatric
Disabilities, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 644, 644 (2001).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Moss et al., supra note 200, at 990.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 989.
212. Id. at 990–91.
213. Id. at 990. Complainants with psychiatric disabilities are approximately as likely to agree to
participate as complainants with other disabilities. Id.
214. Id.
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Swanson and co-authors have advanced two potential explanations for
employers’ refusal to enter settlement negotiations: employers “might have
stronger negative attitudes . . . and simply be more averse to employing” people
with psychiatric disabilities, or they “might calculate that they are more likely to
win in court against . . . a stigmatized mentally ill employee than a physically
215
disabled employee . . . .”
Surveys conducted by the EEOC indicate that employers most frequently
216
decline to participate in mediation because they believe the charges lack merit.
These surveys did not address psychiatric disability or even disability
discrimination, or disparities in employer participation in mediation across
different types of employment discrimination charges, but were aimed at
217
determining what could be done to increase the use of mediation generally.
Nevertheless, the surveys suggest that an employer’s primary consideration in
deciding whether to agree to mediation is, quite rationally, how much it stands to
lose in litigation.
Employers might not necessarily perceive the merits of psychiatric disability
discrimination charges differently from other disability discrimination charges.
218
The EEOC has already categorized charges by apparent merit on initial review,
and of the cases that go to mediation, the likelihood of reaching a settlement is
219
similar for psychiatric and non-psychiatric disabilities. Instead, the disparity in
employer willingness to participate may reflect, not only the perceived likelihood
of winning or losing once litigation commences, but the perceived likelihood of
litigation occurring at all. Often an employer that refuses to mediate will
subsequently agree to mediation after the aggrieved employee has retained an
220
attorney. Indeed, it would seem that employers tend to objectively evaluate the
merits of aggrieved employees’ claims only after receiving some indication that
221
the employee is seriously considering a private lawsuit. The unspoken subtext
in the EEOC’s findings is that employers first consider the likelihood that the
222
employee will litigate a claim in the first place. Regardless of the merits of the
215. Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 129.
216. E. Patrick McDermott et al., An Investigation of the Reasons for the Lack of Employer Participation
in the EEOC Mediation Program, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Dec. 10, 2003), http://www.
eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/report/study3/index.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
217. Id.
218. See Ullman et al., supra note 202, at 644 (describing the charge priority system); Moss et al., supra
note 200, at 990 (noting the EEOC mediation program’s focus on medium-priority charges).
219. Moss et al., supra note 200, at 990.
220. Transcript of Meeting of December 2, 2003: EEOC Mediation Program and the Workplace Benefits
of Mediation, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Dec. 2, 2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/
archive/12-2-03/transcript.html (Panel One, remarks of Dr. Patrick McDermott) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
221. Id. The majority of employers refusing mediation have not yet consulted an attorney at the time, and
many appear to consult an attorney only when the threat of a lawsuit is more imminent. Id.
222. Such a conclusion does not imply any dishonesty on the part of employers responding to the EEOC
survey. The perceived strength of a claim tends to reflect the perceived likelihood that the employee will
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employee’s claim, there is no financial benefit to mediating if the employee
223
shows no intent to sue. Where the employee has a hidden disability and
exposure may deter litigation, the employer would have reason to conclude that
litigation is less likely. Such a conclusion could in turn lead employers to
rationally refuse to participate in mediation, perhaps explaining why mediation
has so often been unavailable to EEOC complainants with psychiatric
disabilities.
C. Possible Bias at the EEOC?
Regardless of the charge priority level, the decision to refer charges to
224
mediation is largely at the discretion of EEOC field offices. Some evidence
supports the possibility that the EEOC is less likely to refer charges involving
225
psychiatric disabilities for mediation than charges involving other disabilities.
Some EEOC staff reported that they declined to refer complainants with
psychiatric disabilities for mediation because “they become too emotional,”
suggesting an assumption that people with psychiatric disabilities lacked the
226
ability to negotiate rationally.
But as damning as the anecdotal evidence may seem, the difference between
psychiatric disabilities and other disabilities is quite small, if statistically
significant; psychiatric disabilities are only four percent less likely to be referred
227
to mediation. It is possible that certain diagnoses are subject to greater degrees
of bias than others; individuals with schizophrenia, specifically, are less likely to
228
be referred to mediation than those with other psychiatric disabilities.

ultimately decide to litigate. Making decisions based on the likelihood of litigation rather than the likelihood of
liability is a rational approach, as the filing of a lawsuit immediately results in some expense and inconvenience
regardless of its merits.
223. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 88, at 1023.
224. See Moss et al., supra note 200, at 989 (examining the actual process of referral for mediation at
EEOC field offices); Questions and Answers About Mediation, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/qanda.cfm (last visited June 4, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (describing numerous factors that the EEOC uses to determine whether a charge is appropriate for
mediation).
225. Moss et al., supra note 200, at 989, 992.
226. Id. at 989. That stereotype has proven to be untrue: complainants with psychiatric disabilities are no
less likely to successfully negotiate a settlement than those with other disabilities. Id. at 992.
227. Id. at 992. A statistically significant disparity is one that exceeds the study’s margin of error; it
strongly supports the inference that the disparity actually exists in the population as a whole and is not a product
of normal variation between random samples. Here, the reasonable inference is that there is an actual disparity
in EEOC treatment of psychiatric and non-psychiatric disabilities, but only a slight one.
228. Id.
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V. PROTECTING EMPLOYEES’ STATUTORY RIGHTS USING TORT LAW AND
OTHER MECHANISMS
As a result of limited remedies and strong disincentives against litigation,
existing enforcement mechanisms are failing to protect the statutorily guaranteed
rights of employees with psychiatric disabilities. This Part argues that a
compensatory damages remedy would provide the appropriate incentives for
229
meaningful enforcement of ADA Title I, and suggests several common-law
230
approaches that a plaintiff might use to obtain a damages remedy as well as a
modification to EEOC policy to increase access to the EEOC’s voluntary
231
mediation program.
A. The Need for Compensatory Damages
The single most significant obstacle to alternative dispute resolution and
other forms of negotiated settlements is employer unwillingness to enter
negotiations, and the most common reason for an employer’s refusal to negotiate
232
is knowledge that the employee is unlikely to litigate. A more consistently
available compensatory damages remedy would create the credible threat of
233
litigation necessary to bring employers to the negotiating table; although a
compensatory damages remedy would not always overcome the significant
disadvantages of litigation, it would make litigation a meaningful option. The
greater likelihood of damages liability, moreover, would incentivize settlement.
A meaningful remedy could even make litigation empowering rather than
debilitating for some plaintiffs; instead of merely prohibiting discrimination
against people with psychiatric disabilities in principle, the law would provide a
234
way to hold employers accountable in practice.
The availability of
compensatory damages would communicate to potential plaintiffs that the legal
235
system takes their grievances seriously,
and a judgment awarding
229. See infra Part V.A.
230. See infra Part V.C.
231. See infra Part V.E.
232. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the barriers to litigation that people with psychiatric disability face).
233. See supra notes 218–22 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for employer refusal to
participate in alternative dispute resolution).
234. See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 74
(2010) (observing that litigation may give plaintiffs the “empowering or cathartic” opportunity to tell their
stories). Litigation’s ability to empower a plaintiff depends in large part on its availability as a meaningful
option that can adequately redress the wrong suffered. See Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 64 (2011) (“The purpose of the adversary system is to provide a forum for a fair fight
between the plaintiff and the defendant, and it is in the very process of this struggle that the plaintiff’s honor is
vindicated.”).
235. See Freckelton, supra note 195, at 321 (observing, in the context of New Zealand’s involuntary
commitment hearing process, that “[i]f the patient emerges from the hearing disappointed, but feels that he has
been treated fairly and with dignity, given an opportunity to air grievances, and listened to . . . it can make a
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compensatory damages would serve as an unambiguous “message from the
236
courts that certain conduct is unacceptable.” These messages might reduce the
perception of unfairness that currently plagues plaintiffs in psychiatric disability
237
discrimination suits.
In addition to creating an incentive to negotiate in good faith, compensatory
238
damages liability can serve as a deterrent against “negligent” discrimination.
As noted previously, many of the disability discrimination cases that fall into the
“disparate impact” category involve forms of conduct by the defendant that can
be deterred by damages liability, whether that conduct is intentional conduct not
driven by a discriminatory motive or strict application of a qualification standard
239
without regard for a person’s disability. These forms of discrimination are
240
arguably “negligent” in that they involve failure to act on an affirmative duty.
The direct threat exception imposes an affirmative duty to make individualized
assessments, and the requirement of reasonable accommodation parallels, to
241
some degree, the duty of reasonable care in tort law. The precise nature of these
242
affirmative duties has been made clear by statute and case law. The likely
rationale for barring compensatory damages, that disparate impact discrimination
243
cannot be deterred by damages liability due to lack of moral culpability, does
significant difference to the patient’s mental state.”).
236. Id. at 313.
237. See Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 118–19 (noting that ADA plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities
were particularly dissatisfied with a “perception of procedural unfairness”). “People with psychiatric disabilities
were significantly less likely than people with other disabilities to feel that they had a chance to tell their stories,
that they were treated with dignity, or that decisionmakers were fair.” Id.
238. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text (noting that employers may be liable solely for
disparate impact discrimination even though their culpability exceeds that typically associated with the
disparate impact cause of action). Law and economics generally characterizes damages liability for negligence
as an incentive to increase safety precautions to the point where an actor’s conduct is no longer negligent. See
generally Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
239. See supra Part III.B (discussing the blurring of causes of action in disability discrimination cases).
240. See Oppenheimer, supra note 160 (drawing parallels between standards of culpability in
antidiscrimination law and tort law, and arguing that “negligent” discrimination should be a separate cause of
action). Professor Oppenheimer observes that the disparate treatment and disparate impact causes of action
respectively resemble intentional and strict liability torts. Id. at 918–20. He also presents the ADA ‘s reasonable
accommodation mandate as an example of a prohibition on what he terms “negligent” discrimination. Id. at
943–44. Surprisingly, in the twenty years since Professor Oppenheimer’s article, courts have almost entirely
eschewed reference to negligence as a theory of liability in ADA and other antidiscrimination cases. Sandra F.
Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 99–100 (2011) (discussing the courts’
surprising failure to consider the idea of negligent discrimination). Nevertheless, one appellate court has
expressly drawn a parallel between “reasonable accommodation” in the ADA and “reasonable care” in tort law.
Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995).
241. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 109, at 68.
242. See Kleiber v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing numerous
cases holding that the interactive process for determining reasonable accommodations is mandatory); supra Part
II.B. (describing the requirements for a sufficient assessment of a putative direct threat).
243. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which established the present remedial
scheme for employment discrimination, never expressly stated a rationale for excluding compensatory damages
for disparate impact discrimination. However, providing “a necessary deterrent” was one of the primary
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244

not apply where a clearly defined affirmative duty exists. Instead, damages
liability may encourage employers to proactively review and change their
policies regarding mental health in a way that the present remedial scheme does
245
not.
Finally, compensatory damages are consistent with the general principle of
246
corrective justice. The fact that disability discrimination often takes the form of
an omission, rather than an animus-based act, should not preclude compensatory
247
damages. Tort law calls for compensation for negligent acts or omissions;
likewise, in the disability discrimination context, failure to act on a statutory
248
obligation should give rise to liability for injury suffered as a result.
The primary objection to increasing the available remedies is that it would
249
encourage excessive litigation. The ADA, in particular, is already “often
250
accused of being a font of abusive and frivolous litigation” and “portrayed . . .

motivations for applying compensatory and punitive damages to intentional discrimination. H.R. REP. NO. 10240, pt. 1, at 69 (1991). Courts and commentators have, to some extent, assumed that this rationale holds true and
applied it to other titles of the ADA. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998)
(suggesting that compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA, which concerns government programs,
would be unfair without notice of alleged discrimination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161, 1244 (1995) (arguing that subjecting unconscious discrimination to a damages remedy would be
counterproductive because such discrimination is unintentional); Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate
Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 132 n.268
(2006) (conceding that the author’s proposal of merging the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories
“would disadvantage employers by providing additional relief to employees even where the employer has not
enacted an intentionally discriminatory policy”). But see Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 948 (1993) (arguing that “there is no principled basis” to
distinguish between the models of discrimination in determining remedies).
244. See Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: Discriminatory Intent as a Prerequisite to
Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1121, 1156 (2000) (“When there is no threat of liability,
individuals could be induced to use too little care.”).
245. See Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 12 (noting that “the absence of a damages
remedy “in Title III, the ADA’s public accommodations title, “gives businesses little reason not to take [a] ‘wait
and see’ approach” of making facilities accessible “only in response to litigation”). Although fee-shifting
arguably incentivizes compliance with nondiscrimination laws, it depends on plaintiffs’ willingness to litigate;
the strong disincentives against litigation that people with psychiatric disabilities face may require something
more to overcome. See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1854 (2005) (arguing that lack of monetary incentive to litigate claims has resulted
in widespread noncompliance with Title II and Title III of the ADA, which address government programs and
public accommodations respectively); supra Part III.D.
246. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 cmt. d (2010)
(discussing rationales for imposing liability for negligence).
247. See Oppenheimer, supra note 160, at 970–73 (1993) (arguing that negligent discrimination should be
actionable in order to focus on the fact of discrimination rather than the defendant’s moral reprehensibility).
248. See id. (arguing that negligent discrimination should be actionable in order to focus on the fact of
discrimination rather than the defendant’s moral reprehensibility).
249. See Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 2 (“[B]usiness groups and their political allies
have often criticized broad civil rights remedies–particularly the availability of monetary damages–as
encouraging abusive and extortionate litigation practices.”)
250. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 109, at 123.
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as a windfall statute for plaintiffs,” and critics are likely to see any increased
252
remedy as inviting nuisance suits. These perceptions may be concerning
because psychiatric disabilities are among the types of disabilities that critics
253
paint as “convenient excuses for special treatment.”
Criticism of Title I based on “abusive and frivolous litigation” is, to a large
extent, misplaced: much of the “abusive” ADA litigation arises from Title III, the
254
public accommodations title, rather than Title I. Interestingly, even those
critical of the volume of ADA litigation concede that the suits they decry as
255
abusive generally have merit.
Existing checks on litigation already prevent the addition of a compensatory
damages remedy from creating a flood of frivolous litigation. Lawyers already
have a financial incentive to serve as “agents of quality control for the court
256
system” and screen out most frivolous claims; this will not change if
compensatory damages are available. Even if the psychiatric disability
complaints filed with the EEOC tended to be weaker than those for other
disabilities, it would not imply that the same is true of lawsuits reaching the court
257
system. In addition, empirical evidence suggests that few potential plaintiffs
actually insist on litigation; EEOC statistics demonstrate that the overwhelming
majority of disability discrimination complainants, including those with
psychiatric disabilities, are willing to accept mediation as an alternative to
258
litigation.
Even if the number of ADA Title I lawsuits would increase, the fear of
clogging the courts with frivolous suits does not justify denying an entire class of
259
plaintiffs the effective protection of a duly passed statute.
Effective

251. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 99, 99 (1999).
252. Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 2–3.
253. Pamela M. Prah, Federal Enforcement of ADA Falls Short, Civil Rights Commission Says in Report,
67 U.S.L.W. 2199 (Oct. 13, 1998).
254. See Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 3–5 (discussing the controversy over “serial
ADA public accommodations litigation”). Members of Congress have focused largely on Title III in repeated
attempts to limit ADA litigation. Id. at 5.
255. Bagenstos, Limited Remedies, supra note 84, at 22.
256. Swanson et al., supra note 22, at 125.
257. Id.
258. Moss et al., supra note 200, at 990.
259. Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1640 (2004) (“The ultimate danger from court action that denies meaningful relief
is that rights will be effectively nullified.”). The United States Supreme Court has suggested in a variety of
contexts that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a meaningful remedy for
prevailing plaintiffs, id. at 1640–41, and it is a fundamental principle of the common law that rights must have
remedies. Id. at 1636–37 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) and Ashby v. White,
92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703)).
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enforcement of the ADA for plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities requires a
260
remedy that makes litigation a meaningful option.
It may also seem paradoxical to create incentives to litigate a claim given the
privacy and health implications of litigation for people with psychiatric
261
disabilities. But there is a vast difference between litigation being an option
with significant disadvantages and litigation being essentially a non-option
because the remedy is illusory. The former allows aggrieved employees to
reserve the option of litigation; the latter does not, which may lead employers to
262
refuse to negotiate a settlement. Not every potential plaintiff needs to litigate;
as long as some choose to do so, the threat of litigation is credible.
B. Can Statutory Solutions Work?
Amending the ADA to specifically address psychiatric disabilities is
unsatisfactory because it could entrench the difference between psychiatric and
263
other disabilities. Already, much of this difference lies in the way society views
264
the disabilities. The social distinction between “physical” and “mental”
disabilities “serves no legitimate rationale and perpetuates the stigmatization of
265
mental illness.” In addition, disability rights advocates are extremely wary of
266
their movement’s potential for fragmentation. For these reasons, disability
rights activists, concerned about differential treatment in the legal system, have
called for eliminating the separation of “physical” and “mental” disabilities in the
267
statute. Enacting statutory language that provides for additional remedies for
psychiatric disabilities comes dangerously close to establishing psychiatric
disability as a privileged class within the disability rights structure and risks

260. See supra Part III.C–D (discussing barriers to litigation that potential plaintiffs with psychiatric
disabilities face); Joan Steinman, Backing Off Bivens and the Ramifications of This Retreat for the Vindication
of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269, 283–84 (1984) (arguing that due process requires not only a
substantive remedy but meaningful access to that remedy).
261. See supra Part III.D (discussing the privacy and mental health concerns that litigation implicates).
262. See supra notes 218–22 and accompanying text (noting reasons for employer refusal to participate in
alternative dispute resolution).
263. See Korn, supra note 17, at 647 (arguing that the mere reference to “mental and physical” disabilities
in the ADA contributes to an “artificial dividing line” between the two).
264. Id. at 649.
265. Id. at 647.
266. See, e.g., Clarice Hausch, From the Executive Director, ADVOCARE 2, 3 (2007), available at
http://wvadvocates.org/assets/docs/pubs/advocare/wvaadvocare30thanniversary.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (“Success will be difficult to achieve if we allow ourselves to be divided into disability silos
competing against each other for funding with a my disability first, win-lose mentality that in the end is never
enough to solve the challenges.”). This concern stems from the larger disability rights movement’s origins in a
number of disability-specific, often competing movements. See generally BAGENSTOS, LAW AND
CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 109, at 12–18 (discussing the history of the disability rights movement).
267. E.g., Korn, supra note 17, at 647–48 (proposing elimination of references to “mental and physical”
disabilities in the ADA with the purpose of eliminating the distinction between the two).
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backlash from a society that has shown much resistance to accommodating
268
psychiatric disabilities.
Amending the Civil Rights Act to provide compensatory damages for
negligent discrimination appears more promising. In fact, courts already use a
quasi-negligence analysis in their treatment of reasonable accommodation under
the ADA and harassment by coworkers under all the federal civil rights
269
statutes. Such a move could provide an effective remedy for victims of overly
subjective direct-threat assessments, but two decades of inaction since Professor
Oppenheimer first proposed a negligence theory of employment discrimination
270
raises doubts about its political feasibility. In addition, even if negligence is
sufficient culpability to impose damages liability, the negligence standard creates
a certain temptation to weigh cost against likely harm in determining whether an
employer was negligent, even when the employer uses workplace policies that
271
violate established law under the ADA.
C. Harnessing Characteristics of Psychiatric Disabilities in Tort and Other
Remedies
Regardless of the merits of amending the ADA or other civil rights statutes,
plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities may be able to assert their rights by another
avenue: the common law. Mark Weber has recently observed that disability
discrimination plaintiffs may often have a variety of viable common-law causes
272
of action available to them in addition to statutory claims. While “race and sex
discrimination plaintiffs have regularly filed claims asserting violations of
common law duties,” common-law claims have appeared far less often in
273
disability discrimination litigation and scholarship. These claims may merit
more attention from plaintiffs’ attorneys than they currently receive, both for
disability discrimination plaintiffs generally and for plaintiffs with psychiatric
268. See id. at 607–09 (noting the common tendency to blame individuals for their psychiatric
disabilities).
269. See Oppenheimer, supra note 160, at 943–44, 946–47 (describing the reasonable accommodation
mandate in the ADA and harassment jurisprudence under the Civil Rights Act as imposing affirmative duties on
employers).
270. See id. Professor Oppenheimer’s article, published in 1993, has had substantial impact in academic
circles, with 147 citing references listed on Westlaw as of March 25, 2012. However, only one of these
references is a primary source, and that citation merely acknowledges the existence of a debate on whether
unconscious discrimination could constitute disparate treatment. Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188,
200 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J., dissenting).
271. See Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (analogizing
reasonable accommodation under the ADA to the Hand formula in tort law); Basas, supra note 147, at 110
n.260 (criticizing courts’ use of pure cost-benefit analysis in determining the reasonableness of
accommodations).
272. Mark C. Weber, The Common Law of Disability Discrimination, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 429, 430
(2012).
273. Id. at 430, 433–34.
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274

Without necessarily considering psychiatric
disabilities in particular.
disabilities as a separate class from other disabilities, courts should weigh the
characteristics of a psychiatric disability as factors in sustaining certain causes of
action or remedies. The nature and effects of psychiatric disabilities may make
275
certain tort actions especially viable in disability discrimination cases.
The United States Supreme Court has already signaled a willingness to
distinguish mental illness from other disabilities on the basis of its unique privacy
276
concerns. In Heller v. Doe, the Court upheld a state law establishing a higher
burden of proof in civil commitment of people with “mental illness” than of
277
people with “mental retardation.” The Court justified its ruling not by the
classification of the disabilities per se, but by the increased probability of
diagnostic error for “mental illness” and the heightened privacy concerns of
278
people with “mental illness” compared to “mental retardation.” Here, the
distinction between considering relevant characteristics of a disability and
considering a diagnosis or label per se is critical, because the differences between
psychiatric and other disabilities may then be considered without splitting off
279
psychiatric disabilities as a separate class.
Several common-law claims may be particularly appropriate for plaintiffs
with psychiatric disabilities. This Part explores three specific tort causes of
action: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and (3) wrongful discharge against public policy. It then
considers the equitable remedy of front pay that is already possible under existing
antidiscrimination laws.
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as the “tort of
280
outrage,”
occurs when an actor “by extreme and outrageous conduct
281
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another . . . .”
274. See generally id. at 430–34 (discussing the potential value of common-law claims to disability
discrimination plaintiffs).
275. See infra Part V.C (discussing specific tort causes of action). Although this Comment focuses on
psychiatric disabilities, similar arguments may apply with equal force to other disabilities, particularly those that
tend to be invisible unless disclosed.
276. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 322–25 (1993) (holding that higher risk of diagnostic error and
more invasive treatments for “mental illness” than “mental retardation” justified a higher standard of proof for
civil commitment).
277. Id.
278. Id. “The mentally ill are subjected to . . . treatment which may involve intrusive inquiries into the
patient’s innermost thoughts. By contrast, the mentally retarded in general are not subjected to these medical
treatments.” Id. at 324–25 (internal citations omitted).
279. See id. at 326–28 (observing the historical distinction between “mentally retarded” and “mentally ill”
in English law, but also making clear that the Court’s holding was based on the characteristics of the two
conditions rather than on common-law tradition).
280. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 37 (2012).
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The fact patterns in psychiatric disability discrimination cases may well
support a finding of recklessness. Recklessness requires that the actor “[know] or
[have] reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize”
282
that his conduct creates a substantial risk of harm. Even if the employer does
not subjectively expect to create this risk, actual knowledge of a psychiatric
disability means actual knowledge of a fact that implies an elevated risk of
283
emotional distress.
Abuse of a position of power, or actual knowledge that the victim is
“peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or
mental condition or peculiarity,” may contribute to a finding that conduct is
284
“extreme and outrageous.” Because both of these factors are arguably present
with disability discrimination in employment, Professor Weber suggests that the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is well suited to employment
discrimination, particularly where the plaintiff is harassed because of a
285
disability. Courts have held that employment relationships inherently create a
286
power disparity with the possibility of abuse, and an employee’s disability
287
increases that power disparity. “Power disparities,” such as those “between a
worker with a disabling condition and a supervisor or coworkers acting with the
288
acquiescence of the supervisor,” strongly support a finding of outrageousness.
Several courts have actually sustained intentional infliction of emotional distress
289
claims based primarily on alleged disability discrimination.
In light of the Second Restatement’s express mention of “mental condition or
290
peculiarity” as a factor in the outrageousness of conduct, the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress may be especially appropriate where the disability
in question is psychiatric. Abundant evidence demonstrates that individuals with
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). The most recent draft of the Third Restatement
uses virtually identical language, merely changing the word “distress” to “harm.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (2012).
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
283. See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text (discussing the high likelihood of emotional distress
resulting from employment discrimination).
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e, f (1965).
285. Weber, supra note 272, at 461–62.
286. See, e.g., White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1210 (La. 1991) (“[M]any of the cases have
involved circumstances arising in the workplace. A plaintiff’s status as an employee may entitle him to a greater
degree of protection from insult and outrage by a supervisor with authority over him than if he were a
stranger.”) (internal citations omitted).
287. Weber, supra note 272, at 462.
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortg., Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1139, 1143–44 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(denying summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff’s supervisor became “distant and hostile” to him
and subsequently terminated his employment after plaintiff disclosed his AIDS diagnosis); Weber, supra note
272, at 462–64 (citing other cases in employment, education, and public accommdations settings). But see id. at
464–65 (citing disability discrimination cases in which courts found the alleged conduct insufficient to raise a
jury question on outrageousness).
290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1965).
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psychiatric disabilities are particularly susceptible to severe emotional distress
291
292
caused by perceived discrimination. Courts have noted this phenomenon, and
the Second Restatement even uses a prank played on a victim with a psychiatric
disability to illustrate what may constitute knowledge that a person is “peculiarly
293
susceptible” to some form of emotional distress. But even the illustration in the
Second Restatement understates the impact of perceived discrimination on
people with psychiatric disabilities: it discusses only the susceptibility to
294
emotional distress caused by the underlying disability. The Second Restatement
does not mention the effect of stigma—a significant omission because stigma
295
contributes greatly to the resulting emotional distress. Courts should weigh
stigmatization of a psychiatric disability in favor of a finding that the psychiatric
disability makes a plaintiff “peculiarly susceptible” to emotional distress, and in
turn a finding that knowledge of the psychiatric disability is knowledge of the
296
plaintiff’s susceptibility.
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Historically, because of concerns about liability to excessive numbers of
plaintiffs, courts have generally been reluctant to find that a duty of care exists
when a plaintiff alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress without
297
suffering physical injury or property damage. One of the few exceptions in
which courts recognize a duty of care is the preexisting duty rule, where duty
298
derives from a preexisting relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

291. See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text (discussing the high likelihood of emotional distress
resulting from employment discrimination).
292. See, e.g., Williams v. Tri-Counties Metropolitan Transp. Dist., 958 P.2d 202, 205 (Or. Ct. App.
1998) (observing that “bias-motivated conduct . . . inflicts distinct emotional harms” and and is more likely to
be outrageous than “other forms of antagonistic behavior.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f, ill. 9 (1965) (asserting that a defendant may be
liable for IIED for burying “a pot with other contents” to publicly humiliate a person who “has the delusion that
a pot of gold is buried in her back yard, and is always digging for it. . . .”).
294. Id.
295. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text (explaining the link between perceived stigma and
emotional distress).
296. In many cases, plaintiffs will likely need to actually make this argument. The inference that
discrimination is particularly harmful for people with stigmatized disabilities is, in spite of empirical evidence,
not universally acepted. See Link et al., supra note 190, at 1622 (noting that “[s]ome reports downplay the
importance of stigma” and that “strong skepticism” still exists about the effects of stigma on people with mental
illness).
297. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 153–54 (4th ed. 2010). A small minority of
states have extended a duty to all foreseeable plaintiffs. Id. at 147 (citing Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437,
443, 446 (Tenn. 1996), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court held that negligent infliction of emotional
distress should be treated as any other negligence case).
298. E.g., Burgess v. Super. Ct., 831 P.2d 1197, 1204 (Cal. 1992) (holding that physician-patient
relationship created an independent duty of care).
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Courts have not considered an employment relationship alone to be sufficient
to give rise to a preexisting independent duty. Most jurisdictions that have
considered the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in the
employment context have analyzed duty using the “zone of danger” and
“bystander” rules, both of which rarely, if ever, apply to disability discrimination
299
because they require conduct creating a risk of physical injury.
However, courts in several jurisdictions have held that claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress are cognizable in the employment setting if
serious emotional distress is sufficiently foreseeable—essentially an
300
“employment plus particular foreseeability” formulation of preexisting duty.
301
Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corp. illustrates this principle. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant employee’s drug screening program caused
him emotional distress by having a representative directly observe him
302
urinating. The First Circuit, applying Louisiana law, held that the defendant
employer had a duty to take reasonable precautions against causing severe
emotional distress in the administration of its drug screening program where
303
severe emotional distress was foreseeable.
Other courts have, without necessarily articulating a specific test for duty,
left open the possibility of allowing negligent infliction of emotional distress
304
claims in the employment setting. At least one court has sustained a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff alleged harassment
305
and termination on the basis of disability.
299. Perodeau v. Hartford, 792 A.2d 752, 770 n.26, 771–72 (Conn. 2002) (listing cases from other
jurisdictions analyzing duty in the context of an employment relationship).
300. E.g., Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 849 F.2d 41, 43–44 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying
Louisiana law, holding that employer had a “duty to use reasonable care in implementing and administering its
drug program so as not to cause serious emotional distress” where emotional injuries exceeding “minimal worry
and inconvenience” were foreseeable); Faulkner v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 552 F. Supp. 2d 546, 559 (M.D.N.C.
2008) (holding that an employer may be liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress if it “should have
realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress”); Dirksen v. Springfield,
842 F. Supp. 1117, 1127 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that an allegation of retaliation for EEOC charge is sufficient
to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Strong v. Terrell, 195 P.3d 977, 982–83 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2008) (holding that negligent infliction of emotional distress is a cognizable claim in the employment
setting and that duty is determined by foreseeability of harm).
301. 849 F.2d 41.
302. Id. at 43.
303. Id. at 43–44.
304. E.g., Photias v. Graham, 14 F. Supp. 2d 126, 131–32 (D. Me. 1998) (declining to categorically hold
that defendant coworker had no duty, stating that further development of facts would be necessary); Wasson v.
Sonoma Cnty. Jr. College Dist., 4 F. Supp. 2d 893, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that workers’ compensation
laws did not bar a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim where the employer’s conduct violated public
policy and implying that such a claim may also be sustainable where an employer’s conduct “exceeds the risks
inherent in the employment relationship.”).
305. Tomick v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., No. CV06408944, 2010 WL 2196576 at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 23, 2010). The court found that the defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of outrageousness required
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. at *4, but also found that a triable question of fact existed on
whether the defendant’s conduct created “an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress.” Id. at *3.
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The Third Restatement of Torts calls for extending duty to “specified
categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct
306
is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.” This approach somewhat
resembles that of the courts that have found a preexisting duty under an
307
“employment plus particular foreseeability” formula.
Even under the Third Restatement’s approach, the way that plaintiffs frame
psychiatric disability discrimination is critical. Because employment is generally
at-will, and employers are entitled to arbitrarily fire employees so long as they do
308
not do so for specifically unlawful reasons, courts are likely to accept the
premise that discharge or suspension of employees is a normal and expected part
309
of employment. However, a plaintiff might also frame the employer’s activity
as something more specific: direct threat evaluation for psychiatric disabilities.
The activity of evaluating a purported direct threat is highly analogous to the
310
activity of employee drug screening in Kelley and the fact that express legal
311
standards exist for evaluation of direct threats suggests that the activity is not so
plaintiff-specific as to reduce duty analysis to foreseeability alone. A court
should be able to conclude as a matter of law that evaluating the alleged
dangerousness of a person with a psychiatric disability is an activity that creates a
special likelihood of serious emotional distress; this would establish a duty using
312
the approach endorsed by the Third Restatement and several states.
If duty exists, then a plaintiff might establish breach of duty through the
313
negligence per se doctrine. The employer’s obligations to participate in the
interactive process to accommodate disability and to objectively assess the
314
existence of a direct threat are well established, and the foreseeable harms
306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 (2012). Although the
foreseeability of harm to the specific plaintiff does not factor into this formulation of preexisting duty, the Third
Restatement nonetheless calls for an inquiry into whether the relationship between the parties and the general
category of activity in which the defendant is engaging give rise to a particularly high likelihood of serious
emotional distress. Id. at cmt. f, cmt. i.
307. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing the “employment plus particular
foreseeability” formulation).
308. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T § 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Rev. 2009).
309. E.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991) (“We further recognize that
properly to manage its business, every employer must on occasion review, criticize, demote, transfer, and
discipline employees.”).
310. See supra notes 301–03 and accompanying text (discussing Kelley, 849 F.2d 41).
311. See supra Part II.B (discussing employers’ affirmative duties in evaluating direct threats).
312. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. f (2012)
(discussing courts’ approaches to determining what activities are of such a nature that negligence is “especially
likely” to cause serious emotional harm).
313. Under the negligence per se doctrine, a court may “adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 286 (1965). A statute or regulation may be adopted as the standard of care if the statute is intended
to protect a class of persons including the plaintiff, to prevent the type of harm that actually occurred, and to
prevent the specific danger that actually caused the harm. Id.
314. See supra Part II.B.
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315

associated with discrimination undoubtedly include severe emotional distress.
A violation of either of these standards could arguably constitute negligence per
316
se. Although it is true that the negligence per se doctrine applies most
commonly to criminal statutes, the use of a well-established civil statute to
317
establish a standard of care is “an intriguing possibility.” Justice Brennan,
dissenting in Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, at least
318
contemplated the possibility.
He argued that federal jurisdiction was
appropriate for a negligence per se claim based on violation of a federal statute,
because the question of negligence would depend on whether the petitioner had
319
violated the federal statute, and, in turn, on interpretation of the statute. In
making this argument, Justice Brennan must necessarily have assumed that
conduct violating a statute, but not subject to criminal penalties, could constitute
320
negligence per se.
At least one commentator has specifically advocated the use of a wellestablished civil statute as a standard of care. Laura Rothstein argued that courts
should find negligence per se based on violations of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 because, ten years after the passage of the
statute, reasonable education professionals should be well aware of its
321
requirements. Professor Rothstein’s argument applies especially well to direct
threat assessment under the ADA because the employer’s obligations have been
settled law for well over a decade. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
direct threat exception as requiring an objective, individualized assessment based
322
on “reasoned and medically sound judgments” has not changed in a quarter323
century.

315. See Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that
emotional distress is “a predictable, and thus foreseeable, consequence” or even “a probable result” of disability
discrimination).
316. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 297, at 86–87 (describing factors used to determine whether a
statute becomes the standard of care).
317. Weber, supra note 272, at 457 n.165 (suggesting negligence per se as a possible means of obtaining
relief in ADA claims lacking an adequate statutory remedy).
318. 478 U.S. 804, 823 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
319. Id.
320. See 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2006) (listing penalties for violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
with many types of violations subject only to a civil penalty); Merrell-Dow, 478 U.S. at 830–31 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (describing a statutory enforcement scheme that relies heavily on injunctions and civil seizure of
products).
321. Laura F. Rothstein, Accountability for Professional Misconduct in Providing Education to
Handicapped Children, 14 J.L. & EDUC. 349, 373–74 (1985).
322. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–85 (1987).
323. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (holding that Arline controls interpretation of the
ADA’s direct threat exception).
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3. Wrongful Discharge Against Public Policy
Most U.S. jurisdictions now recognize the tort of wrongful discharge in
324
violation of public policy, which imposes liability on employers for discharges
325
that violate some clearly expressed public policy. Two considerations affect
whether disability discrimination can give rise to a cause of action for wrongful
discharge.
First, courts recognizing the cause of action have focused on protection of an
326
employee’s activities furthering public policy. Courts may resist extending the
327
tort of wrongful discharge to cover acts that are not retaliatory in nature.
However, “[s]ome courts have a more expansive idea of the public policy tort
than merely a claim for retaliation, and the Restatement allows for such an
328
interpretation.” Professor Weber discusses Ward v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., in
which a federal court in Idaho denied summary judgment on a wrongful
329
discharge claim based purely on disability discrimination. In Ward, the
defendant-employer asked the plaintiff whether he was still on medication
following a surgical procedure, and terminated the plaintiff’s employment when
330
the plaintiff responded affirmatively. Although it was unclear whether Idaho
law allowed a wrongful discharge claim to proceed where statute provided a
remedy, the Ward court found it persuasive that the Idaho Supreme Court had
331
implied the viability of such a claim. When it first recognized the tort of
wrongful discharge against public policy, the Idaho Supreme Court had cited,
332
among other out-of-state cases, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., a wrongful
333
discharge case that arose from sexual harassment. Although Monge arguably
334
involved retaliation rather than purely discriminatory discharge, the Ward court

324. See generally Michael D. Moberly & Carolann E. Doran, The Nose of the Camel: Extending the
Public Policy Exception Beyond the Wrongful Discharge Context, 13 LAB. LAW. 371, 371–72 (1997) (giving an
overview of the trend toward recognizing and expanding the scope of the wrongful discharge tort).
325. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T § 4.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, rev. 2009).
326. See id. § 4.01(a) (stating that an employer is liable for taking action against an employee “because
the employee has engaged or will engage in protected activity”); Weber, supra note 272, at 457 (observing that
the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is primarily directed at retaliatory conduct).
327. See Weber, supra note 272, at 458 (noting that “some courts” have expanded the tort of wrongful
discharge beyond retaliation but implying that these courts are in the minority).
328. Id. It is unclear how Professor Weber reaches his conclusion about the Restatement because the
language he cites refers to the employee’s “other activity directly furthering a substantial public policy.” Id. at
458 n.171.
329. Id. at 458, 458 n.174 (citing Ward v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1194–95 (D.
Idaho 2005)).
330. Ward, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
331. Id. at 1194 (citing Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54, 58 (Idaho 1977)).
332. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
333. Jackson, 563 P.2d at 58 (citing Monge, 316 A.2d 549).
334. 316 A.2d at 550–51 (describing facts that suggest the plaintiff was fired for rebuffing a foreman’s
sexual advances).
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pointed out that the facts of Monge also “presumably could have led to a
335
statutory sex discrimination claim.”
Second, courts are divided on whether the existence of statutory remedies
336
always preempts a tort claim for wrongful discharge. Courts have generally
treated the tort of wrongful discharge against public policy primarily as a gap
337
filler to enforce statutes that provide no private remedies, and have been
338
especially reluctant to extend the tort to antidiscrimination statutes. However,
some jurisdictions evaluate whether the legislature intended for statutory
339
remedies to be exclusive; a few courts have sustained the tort cause of action in
340
employment discrimination cases using this analysis. Alternately, courts
inquire into the adequacy of the statutory remedies. These courts either evaluate
341
only adequacy as a deterrent against violation of the statute or the adequacy of
342
the statutory remedies both as a deterrent and as compensation for the victim.
Finally, in Ward v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., the court sustained the plaintiff’s
wrongful discharge tort claim without evaluating the adequacy of statutory
343
remedies for disability discrimination.
Any of the minority approaches might allow for the tort claim to avoid
preemption in psychiatric disability discrimination cases. The ADA expressly
states that it “shall not be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and

335. Ward, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
336. See infra notes 337–43 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
337. See, e.g., Van Kruiningen v. Plan B, LLC, 485 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96 (D. Conn. 2007) (stating that “the
Connecticut Supreme Court intended merely to provide a modicum of judicial protection for those who did not
already have a means of challenging their dismissals . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted); McGarvey v.
Key Property Mgmt. LLC, 211 P.3d 503, 507 (Wyo. 2009) (stating that “[t]his public policy exception is
narrow in scope” and requring that the plaintiff show that “there is no other remedy available to protect the
interests of the discharged employee or society.”).
338. Kimberly C. Simmons, Annotation, Pre-emption of Wrongful Discharge Cause of Action by Civil
Rights Laws, 21 A.L.R.5th 1, 22–23 (1994); see also, e.g., Brudnicki v. General Electric Co., 535 F. Supp. 84,
89 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“In light of these statutory remedies, the Court will not imply an independent cause of
action in this context.”).
339. The Restatement of Employment Law endorses this approach, but observes that courts often decline
to extend it to public policies articulated by civil rights statutes. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T § 4.01 cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 2, rev. 2009).
340. E.g., Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1229–30 (Okla. 1992) (holding that state
antidiscrimination statute did not evidence intent to abrogate common-law rights and stating that “[t]he growth
of the common law in the area of master/servant relationship will not be stunned by legislative silence.”).
341. Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 773 N.E.2d 526, 534 (Ohio 2002) (“The mere absence of recovery for
emotional distress is not enough to convince us that the remedies . . . are somehow insufficient to vindicate the
policy . . . .”); Martin v. Clinical Pathology Laboratories, Inc., 343 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting a
tort claim for wrongful discharge because state criminal penalties were an adequate deterrent).
342. Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 108 P.3d 437, 445 (Kan. 2004) (holding that the statutory
remedy was inadequate on the basis of “differences in process, differences in claimant control, and differences
in the damages available” as compared to tort action); Reddy v. Cascade Gen., Inc., 206 P.3d 1070 (Or. Ct.
App. 2009) (holding that a statutory remedy is adequate only if the statute provides for such remedies “as are
needed to make the plaintiff whole,” including compensation for emotional distress).
343. 392 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1194–95 (D. Idaho 2005).
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procedures” of any other law “that provides greater or equal protection for the
344
rights of individuals with disabilities . . . .” This language appears to expressly
345
indicate the intent not to foreclose any common-law claims. Even if the tort
claim of wrongful discharge against public policy is based on violation of the
ADA itself, the tort claim is a state law claim that provides greater remedies for
the same wrongful conduct, falling squarely within the type of law contemplated
346
by the non-preemption clause.
Because the privacy implications of litigating a disability discrimination
claim render purely equitable relief inadequate to compensate plaintiffs with
347
psychiatric and other “hidden” disabilities, the ADA should not preempt the
tort of wrongful discharge for these plaintiffs in a jurisdiction that considers
adequacy for compensation. Unless knowledge of a psychiatric disability was
already widespread in the plaintiff’s workplace before the discriminatory act, the
348
plaintiff cannot be restored to the status quo ante by equitable remedies alone.
A court that considers only the adequacy of remedies for deterrence should also
sustain the tort claim by analyzing more than the remedies’ direct effects on the
defendant. Where the act of litigating a claim undermines the remedy, and the
threat of litigation is not credible, the remedy’s deterrent value against workplace
349
discrimination is largely illusory.
Jurisdictions that have not adopted the approach of inquiring into the
adequacy of statutory remedies should do so for the sake of enforcing not only
the ADA but other statutes as well. They should examine adequacy on a case-bycase basis, and determine whether the remedies can sufficiently compensate the
plaintiff or whether the remedies could have deterred the defendant’s conduct.
For many plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities, this inquiry would weigh in
favor of sustaining the tort claim of wrongful discharge.

344. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2006).
345. Weber, supra note 272, at 435–36. The U.S. Supreme Court has viewed federal preemption of
common-law remedies identically to federal preemption of state statutes. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (holding that the federal National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not preempt
tort remedies).
346. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (referring to any law “that provides greater or equal protection for the
rights of individuals with disabilities”); Weber, supra note 272, at 436 (describing the ADA as “a one-way
antidiscrimination ratchet”).
347. See supra notes 165–81 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacy of purely equitable
relief).
348. Id.
349. See Waterstone, supra note 245, at 1854 (arguing that lack of monetary incentive to litigate claims
has resulted in widespread noncompliance with Title II and Title III of the ADA, which address government
programs and public accommodations respectively).

1032

_06_HSIEH_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:42 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol.44

4. Front Pay as a Remedy
The unique situation of plaintiffs with psychiatric and other hidden
350
disabilities may justify the award of front pay as an equitable remedy. The
circumstances that justify front pay include “continuing hostility between the
plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or . . . psychological injuries suffered
351
by the plaintiff as a result of the discrimination.” To justify front pay, hostility
352
must exceed that normally expected from litigation.
Litigation related to a psychiatric disability, unlike that for more readily
visible disabilities, makes the disability known to people who may not have
353
previously been aware of it and exposes the plaintiff to stigma. This stigma
may create hostility based on the disability itself, and entirely apart from the
354
litigation. In addition, the especially strong likelihood that a person with a
psychiatric disability will suffer psychological injuries as a result of an
employer’s wrongful conduct weighs in favor of awarding front pay because
355
debilitating psychological harm can make reinstatement to a job impracticable.
Courts should also take into account the stigma surrounding psychiatric
disabilities in determining a reasonable period for which to award front pay. In
determining the amount of front pay to award, courts may consider “a discharged
employee’s duty to mitigate, the availability of employment opportunities, the
period within which one by reasonable efforts may be re-employed, the
employee’s work and life expectancy, the discount tables to determine the
present value of future damages and other factors that are pertinent on
356
prospective damage awards.”
A psychiatric disability can easily make re-employment more difficult: the
357
disability is especially likely to have been exacerbated by discrimination, and a
person who has litigated a psychiatric disability discrimination suit exposes the
350. See supra note 164(describing front pay and its uses).
351. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001).
352. Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that front pay was
appropriate, rather than reinstatement, because the “antagonism between [the parties] rendered reinstatement
‘not feasible’.”).
353. See supra notes 179–181 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosure of a disability that
accompanies litigation).
354. See supra Part III.A (discussing the stigma associated with psychiatric disabilities).
355. See Farley, 197 F.3d at 1339 (affirming award of front pay in part because the plaintiff’s psychiatric
“symptoms were heavily influenced by” a hostile work environment).
356. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Courts have fairly broad discretion in determining the length of time for which to
award front pay, so long as the award does not “require unreasonable speculation.” Donlin v. Philips Lighting
N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 87–88 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in an award of 10 years’ front
pay).
357. See supra notes 186–194 and accompanying text (discussing the exacerbation of psychiatric
disabilities by discrimination).
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358

disability to all potential future employers. As long as employers tend to view
359
job candidates with psychiatric disabilities particularly negatively, it is
reasonable to believe that the plaintiff will take more time to find new
employment than one with a more visible disability. This inference justifies
awarding front pay for an extended period.
D. Toward the Goal of Encouraging Mediation
Even with monetary damages, litigation would not become the preferred
option for most individuals who suffer psychiatric disability discrimination, nor
should it be. Litigation may negatively impact the health of a plaintiff who
360
already has a psychiatric disability, even if the plaintiff prevails. Where
mediation is actually available, the advantage of confidentiality makes it
361
preferable to litigation for many people with psychiatric disabilities. However,
the potential of monetary recovery makes litigation a meaningful option that
some aggrieved employees will choose, which, in turn, gives employers a real
362
incentive to enter mediation or make good-faith attempts to reach a settlement.
The EEOC has a role to play in encouraging parties to opt for alternative
dispute resolution as well. Even if the difference in rate of referral between
363
psychiatric and other disabilities is relatively small, it is statistically significant;
the EEOC should work to ensure that stereotypes about psychiatric disabilities do
364
not affect its decision-making processes. Possible changes might take the form
of instructions to field offices that the complainant’s perceived ability to
365
negotiate should not affect whether the agency refers a case to mediation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In passing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress aimed to
protect people with a broad range of disabilities from employment
366
discrimination. However, people with psychiatric disabilities have struggled to

358. Orme, supra note 166, at 616–17 (discussing courts’ reluctance to allow plaintiffs to sue under
fictitious names).
359. See supra note 110 (citing studies of employer attitudes toward psychiatric disabilities).
360. STEFAN, supra note 16, at 15–16; see also Noel, supra note 174, at 406 (making the same argument
about private enforcement of health insurance parity).
361. See supra notes 179–181 and accompanying text (discussing how the likelihood of disclosure
discourages litigation).
362. See supra Part IV.B (discussing reasons for employer refusal to participate in alternative dispute
resolution).
363. Moss et al., supra note 200, at 992.
364. See supra Part IV.C (discussing bias at EEOC field offices against referring complainants with
psychiatric disabilities to mediation).
365. Id.
366. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54 (2008)

1034

_06_HSIEH_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:42 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol.44
protect their statutorily guaranteed rights, in part due to an enforcement
framework that limits remedies for the forms of discrimination that they most
367
frequently face. The ADA, like other civil rights statutes, allows for
368
compensatory damages only for intentional discrimination.
Because the lines between disparate treatment and disparate impact are
blurry, and because courts have been reluctant to find intentional discrimination,
369
plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities are often limited to equitable remedies.
As a result, for people who suffer discrimination on the basis of psychiatric
disabilities, the act of seeking a remedy often undermines the remedy itself by
370
revealing the plaintiff’s previously hidden disability. This strongly discourages
371
litigation and, in turn, allows potential defendants to refuse to enter settlement
372
negotiations or alternative dispute resolution. The strikingly high rate at which
employers refuse to participate in the EEOC’s mediation program, especially
when the complainant has a psychiatric disability, suggests that employers
373
currently have insufficient incentive to negotiate.
Common-law causes of action, which the plaintiff’s bar has strangely
374
neglected in disability discrimination cases, could provide plaintiffs with a
compensatory damages remedy to adequately compensate them for harm suffered
375
as well as to incentivize good-faith settlement negotiations by defendants. This
Comment has examined specific tort actions that seem particularly appropriate
for psychiatric disabilities and outlined ways in which the characteristics of
376
psychiatric disabilities may realistically justify sustaining these tort actions.
Returning to the fictional narrative that began this Comment, John might not
have been completely denied a remedy had his lawyer considered the possibility
of pleading tort claims. Because none of the common-law causes of action
outlined in this Comment require disability-based motives, a court might have
allowed them to proceed to trial without necessarily finding intentional
discrimination. Even prior to any litigation, the possibility of tort liability could
(expressly overturning case law that narrowed the definition of “disability”).
367. See supra Part III.B–C (discussing the blurring of causes of action in disability discrimination and
the inadequacy of purely equitable remedies for plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities).
368. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text (describing the ADA’s remedial scheme).
369. See supra Part III.B (describing the difficulty that plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities face in
proving discriminatory intent).
370. See supra Part III.C (discussing how equitable remedies are undermined by disclosure of a
psychiatric disability).
371. See supra Part III.D (discussing the deterrent effects against litigation that potential psychiatric
disability discrimination plaintiffs face).
372. See supra Part IV.B (discussing reasons for employer refusal to participate in alternative dispute
resolution).
373. Id.
374. Weber, supra note 272, at 430, 433–34.
375. See supra Part V.A (discussing the need for a consistently available compensatory damages remedy
in psychiatric disability discrimination cases).
376. See supra Part V.C (describing various common-law causes of action).
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have encouraged John’s employer to accept EEOC mediation or otherwise enter
into settlement negotiations. Thus, in the absence of statutory changes, the
common law could offer people with psychiatric disabilities an effective solution
to the Catch-22 that has kept them from enforcing their rights under the ADA.
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